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The books reviewed in this issue of the IJLI reflect the ongoing 
globalization of the legal profession. Among international topics covered are 
terrorism, copyright, human rights, and the environment. There are also 
reviews of minority rights in both Europe and Asia as well as reviews of the 
ongoing legal reforms in Russia and China. We have also delved a bit deeper 
into the substance of a work with an indepth review of European Fair 
Trading Law, The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive by Howells, 
Micklitz and Wilhelmsson.  This text is reviewed by Professor James Nehf.  
Finally, Marylin Raisch, Associate Law Librarian for International and 
Foreign Law at the Georgetown Law Library brings it all together in her 
review of Oxford University Press’s Handbook of Comparative Law. Enjoy!  
 
Thomas Mills, Book Review Editor 
Research Attorney 
Cornell Law Library 
 
National Minority Rights in Europe. By Tove H. Malloy. Oxford; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2005. Pp. xi, 354. ISBN 0-19-927443-6. 
£64.95; US$125.00. 
 
In the wake of 21st century civil wars, unlawful occupations, and 
sovereignty waiting in the wings for many minority groups around the world, 
National Minority Rights in Europe details the development of minority rights 
in Europe and provides a model for the rest of the world. Although the title 
designates the regional focus as Europe, Malloy provides numerous examples 
throughout history from other regions of the world, which increases the 
book’s appeal and demonstrates the subject’s universal application.  
This monograph is much more than a historical account. Malloy 
considers the many phases of the development of minority rights in Europe, 
including jurisprudence, legal and political theory, moral and political 
philosophy, and international relations throughout the text. Perhaps in light of 
this broad coverage of such a wide array of topics, Malloy does not treat these 
subjects exhaustively and he excludes a critique of theories of rights, 
freedoms, duties or responsibilities, as well as other major theories, such as 
democracy, pluralism, and liberalism, to name a few. The coverage of 
jurisprudence is also limited, and full case studies are not provided. Instead, 
cases are discussed to reveal examples of national minority rights 
implementation, or lack thereof.    
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The definition of minority is the core of the discussion in part one, 
and readers should note that Malloy’s focus here is on a specific type of 
minority, namely, national minorities or autochthonous minorities. 
Autochthonous minorities are native to the region, in this case certain regions 
of Europe that were once either independent or belonged to a neighboring 
state.  Other groups of minorities, for example, ethnic minorities, are only 
discussed in passing to distinguish the topic at hand throughout the text. Thus, 
the overarching theme of this book is what Malloy refers to as the European 
international politics of accommodation of national minorities.  
Part two provides a noteworthy analysis of political theories and 
moral and political philosophies that have played a role in the development of 
national minority rights in Europe. Malloy addresses the idea of “co-nation” 
and its several characteristics: inclusion, recognition and deliberation. 
Nationalism, self-determination, national identity, autonomy, and citizenship 
are among the many aspects of political philosophy that Malloy explores at 
length.    
Part three widens the scope to include international governance and 
European integration, with a particular look at the Council of Europe, which 
preceded the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
(FCNM). An examination of the travaux preparatoires of the FCNM, a table 
of which can be found in the beginning of this book, is also discussed here. 
The co-nation theme continues in this section, with further discussion of 
collective rights and political representation in the post-FCNM period. In 
reviewing these particular topics Malloy highlights the actions of the 
Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe, one of the key 
committees that support the process of democratization in post-1989 
democracies in Europe. 
  Malloy is a Senior Research Associate with the European Centre for 
Minority Issues, where she is in charge of the EU program and serves as the 
Managing Editor of the European Yearbook of Minority Issues and a 
permanent member of the Danish Foreign Service.  Her extensive research on 
this topic is reflected by the comprehensive bibliography and the wealth of the 
pertinent footnotes. This title is particularly geared towards an academic 
audience and those readers involved in policymaking. This book would be a 
good addition to any international collection, in particular those libraries with 
a focus on human rights literature. 
 
Aslihan Bulut 
Reference Librarian 
Arthur W. Diamond Law Library 
Columbia University School of Law 
New York, NY USA 
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Terror and Anti-terrorism: A Normative and Practical Assessment 
(International and Comparative Criminal Law Series). By Christopher L. 
Blakesley. Ardsley, New York: Transnational Publishers, 2006. Pp. ix, 329. 
ISBN 1-57105-332-8. US$125.00. 
 
Christopher L. Blakesley, the Cobeaga Law Firm Professor of Law at 
UNLV’s William S. Boyd School of law, is an accomplished scholar in the 
area of international and comparative criminal law, and has authored a 
number of publications in that area. He is also a very active member of the 
American National Section of the International Association of Penal Law and 
one of several scholars who posts to that organization’s blog 
(http://www.aidpblog.org/).  Terror and Anti-Terrorism can be taken to be 
Blakesley’s attempt to weigh in on the very relevant and in vogue legal topic 
of terrorism and responses to it. 
In Terror and Anti-Terrorism, Blakesley sets out some rather difficult 
tasks for himself.  He attempts to provide an objective definition of 
“terrorism” and explain why such a definition is necessary and how it should 
be applied.  He also attempts to explain the legal context for terrorism, i.e., its 
relationship to both domestic crimes and war, and touch on how all of this 
affects us as humans.  Considering the difficulty of these tasks, Blakesley is 
somewhat successful.  He makes a good attempt at defining “terrorism” and 
does a good job of explaining why it should be defined.  But after he has laid 
out his basic argument, Blakesley pursues too many seemingly tangential 
arguments and examples for this reviewer, and his attempts to give the book a 
literary bent seem to take away from his basic arguments. 
Blakesley’s proposed definition of terrorism is, “[V]iolence 
committed by any means; causing death, great bodily harm, or serious 
property damage; to innocent individuals; with the intent to cause those 
consequences or with wanton disregard for those consequences; and for the 
purpose of coercing or intimidating some specific group, or government, or 
otherwise to gain some perceived political, military, religious, or other 
philosophical benefit.”  He also adds “without justification or excuse,” 
because he conceptualizes matters like terrorism and war by analogy to 
domestic criminal law and its defenses. 
Blakesley provides two good reasons why it is necessary to have an 
objective definition of “terrorism.”  One, while “terrorism” exists only as a 
term, various groups have more freedom to use it to describe the conduct of 
their enemies, whatever that may be.  And two, because of any jurisdictional 
differences terrorism may have from other crimes, as terrorism may give rise 
to jus cogens principles, and thus universal jurisdiction, which Blakesley says 
that it unquestionably does.    
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  While Blakesley’s definition of terrorism attempts to be objective, his 
scholarly agenda does not.  Unsurprisingly, Blakesley has particular opinions 
about his area of expertise (for instance, he is working on another book titled 
Clear and Present Danger: Evisceration of Human & Civil Rights in the War 
on Terrrorism and the War on Drugs).  These views are present in Terror and 
Anti-Terrorism.  The fact that Blakesley takes the somewhat controversial 
position that states can commit terrorism is a good example of this, as is the 
fact that he begins the book by using the bombing of Nagasaki as an example 
of a terror tactic.  Regarding his argument that states can commit terrorism, 
Blakesley does some legal calisthenics to support this position, both by 
explaining how only this paradigm supports having a truly objective 
definition of terrorism, and by differentiating terrorism from war crimes and 
crimes against humanity committed by a state. The result is rather convincing. 
While many of Blakesley’s positions are actually not much different 
from those of many other legal scholars, they unfortunately seem more 
polemic than they really are because of Blakesley’s writing style, which is 
replete with literary references.  The book opens with a quote from Candide, 
ends with a quote from Paradise Lost, and many of its chapters open with 
quotes from W.H. Auden.  The effect seems to take away from Terror and 
Anti-Terrorism as legal argument and make it more like ruminations on a 
subject. This is, however, a deliberate style that Blakesley believes in.1 
Terror and Anti-Terrorism may actually suffer because Blakesley has 
published widely on international criminal law.  Parts of the book have the 
feel of an article that has been beefed up for publication in a longer format.  
Indeed, Blakesley has written three articles and delivered at least three papers 
or speeches with titles including the phrase “terror and anti-terrorism” or 
“terror and counter-terrorism,” and one questions his reason for making such 
long examples of things such as the extradition of Augusto Pinochet, until 
noticing that these are topics he has studied in the past.  Additionally, the 
book could have been edited more closely.  For instance, the sentence, “The 
Akayesu decision suggested that that when there is no state of war, terrorism 
or crimes against humanity” (p.203), is not really preceded or followed by 
anything that would help explain it, and thus creates unnecessary confusion. 
While Terror and Anti-Terrorism has some shortcomings, scholars 
studying the subject will nonetheless want to read it to compare Blakesley’s 
definition of “terrorism” to the others that have been proposed, and students 
                                                 
1 “Thoughts I have been having over the past several years on the impact of good 
literature on helping us understand ourselves, the law, and each other.  I have been 
writing these down and in my books and articles.  I have expounded on them in works 
currently in progress or at press.”  Christopher Blakesley, On What We Can Become – 
Thoughts Prompted by Mike and the “Lucifer Effect,” AIDP BLOG, (Mar. 21, 2007).  
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researching international and non-U.S. responses to terrorism and related 
offenses may choose to use the book for its wealth of citations.  The book, 
however, should not be read for its analysis of post-9/11 anti-terrorism in the 
U.S.—despite concluding with two chapters on the subject, Blakesley does 
not attempt to give it an in-depth analysis.  
 
  David Dames 
Reference Librarian 
Deane Law Library 
Hofstra University School of Law 
Hemstead, NY USA 
 
      
Minority Rights in Asia: A Comparative Legal Analysis. By Joshua 
Castellino and Elvira Domínguez Redondo. Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2006. Pp. ix, 286. ISBN 0-19-929695-7. £60.00; 
US$105.00. 
 
The dearth of minority rights literature focused on Asia inspired 
Joshua Castellino, Lecturer at the Irish Centre for Human Rights, National 
University of Ireland, and Elvira Domínguez Redondo, Post-Doctoral Fellow 
for the Irish Research Council for Humanities and Social Sciences, to write 
this organized and informative work.  In addition to providing an overview of 
the human rights debate as it pertains to Asia, the authors present case studies 
of the minority rights regimes adopted by four states in the region: India, 
China, Malaysia, and Singapore.   This comparative approach reveals the 
significant differences between the mechanisms employed by each state for 
the projection of minority rights.   
The first chapter provides a brief history of international human rights 
regimes, including a discussion of key international treaties, before 
introducing the “Asian Values Debate,” which considers whether Asian states 
espouse specific values that are incompatible with universalist human rights 
norms.  The authors briefly describe the three models of Asian values, which 
share certain core elements, such as respect for authority and the priority of 
law and social order above individual civil and political rights.  In addition to 
these values, Castellino and Domínguez Redondo identify the emphasis on 
sovereignty among Asian states as a primary reason for the absence of a 
collective human rights system in the region.  Despite this, however, Asian 
state participation in international human rights treaties is substantial, as 
demonstrated in the authors’ survey of Asian participation in certain core 
human rights treaties.  The chapter concludes with an overview of state 
2007] BOOK REVIEWS       299 
 
 
attitudes toward minority rights in each region within Asia – central, south, 
east, and southeast. 
The second chapter presents the first case study – India.  After 
introducing the relevant historical background, the authors identify the 
minorities in India, including the scheduled castes and tribes described in the 
Indian Constitution.  The authors then examine the substantive provisions of 
Indian minority rights law, addressing India’s religious protections, its 
provisions for linguistic rights, and the affirmative action measures conferred 
on the scheduled castes and tribes.  The case study concludes with a 
discussion of the remedies available under Indian law for minority rights 
violations. 
The chapters on China, Malaysia, and Singapore follow the same 
format.  Each case study illustrates the singularities of the particular state 
discussed.  China’s extraordinary diversity (the state recognizes fifty-six 
internal “nationalities”) and rapid economic growth, for example, contribute 
to a unique minority rights regime.  Likewise, Malaysia’s affirmative action 
programs targeted at the majority population, and Singapore’s rigorously 
managed meritocracy reflect significantly different approaches to minority 
rights protection. 
The concluding chapter offers a comparative perspective on the four 
cases studies presented, followed by recommendations for increased 
international cooperation.  The authors emphasize the importance that an 
understanding of local conditions plays in international efforts to effect 
worthwhile change in the region.  This work, written in clear, unbiased prose, 
furthers that understanding.  It is a valuable addition to any library that 
collects in the areas of human rights law, or general foreign, international, and 
comparative law.  In addition to its thoughtful analysis of the subject matter, 
the work offers a well-organized index, an extensive bibliography, a table of 
cases, a table of international instruments and domestic legislation, and a table 
of official and governmental sources. 
 
Hilary Hardcastle 
Sedgwick, Detert, Moran & Arnold, LLP 
San Fransisco, CA USA 
 
 
Russia, Europe, and the Rule of Law (Law in Eastern Europe). Edited by 
Ferdinand Feldbrugge. Leiden; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007. 
Pp. 1, 223. ISBN 90-04-15533-3. €110.00; US$149.00. 
 
This book contains a collection of twelve short, scholarly essays on 
the Russian legal system; it also contains chapters on Serbian and Bulgarian 
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law.  The essays cover a wide range of topics, including in-depth discussion 
of the Russian Constitutional Court, judicial review, lay judges, judicial 
culture, the procuracy, and EU judicial cooperation with Russia.  While the 
chapters on relatively narrow legal topics are interesting, they are pitched to a 
scholarly and specialist audience and assume significant background 
knowledge.  They are unlikely to be of interest to those without knowledge of 
Russian and East European legal issues.   
Ferdinand Feldbrugge, the editor, is Professor Emeritus for East 
European Law at Leiden University and has served as Special Advisor Soviet 
and East European Affairs ("Sovietologist-in-Residence") to the Secretary-
General of NATO from 1987 to 1989.  He selected these essays from among 
those presented at the VII World Congress of International Council for 
Central and East European Studies held in Berlin in July 2005.  
Only his essay weaves together common threads from the other chapters.   
Unlike the other chapters, Professor Feldbrugge’s integrative final 
chapter is of general interest.  He gives a sweeping account of Russia’s past 
fifteen years, arguing that the turmoil has largely abated and that a new legal 
system is in place.  Legal policy has shifted from legislation to the courts and 
to the Constitutional Court in particular.  He discusses the trial of former 
oligarch Khodorkovskii, with its enormous political implications, as no 
“ordinary criminal case.”  He points out that Russia’ future depends in large 
part on its relations with Europe, and that for now the European Union’s 
course in its relationship with Russia is unclear.  He argues that the wise 
course for Russia is to “mark time and preserve its options” while Europe 
decides its future.  Unlike many commentators, Professor Feldbrugge’s 
greatest concern for Russia’s rule of law is not the certain authoritarian 
tendencies, but rather the fact that Russia has not yet come to grips with its 
Stalinist past.  
For scholars of the Russian judicial system, this book is required 
reading.  For general readers, most of the book will be far too narrowly 
focused, with the exception of the last chapter which provides a very 
thoughtful and interesting overview of legal currents. 
 
Mary Holland 
Director, LL.M. Lawyering Program 
NYU Law School 
New York, NY USA 
 
 
 
 
 
2007] BOOK REVIEWS       301 
 
 
Same Sex Relationships: From ‘Odious Crime’ to ‘Gay Marriage’. By 
Stephen Cretney. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. Pp. 1, 
346. ISBN 0-19-929773-8. £25.00; US$45.00. 
 
The Civil Partnership Act of 2004 is the law of England that 
recognizes the legal status of relationships between same-sex partners. The 
provisions of the act, which are numerous and detailed, establish the process 
by which same-sex couples can register their unions as civil partnerships. 
According to Stephen Cretney, a well-known writer and expert in English 
family law, this statute is the latest step in the process of moving homosexual 
relationships from criminal acts to marriage, although he points out that, 
according to its framers, the Civil Partnership Act does not establish same-sex 
marriages; civil partnerships are seen as parallel but different legal 
relationships. In Same Sex Relationships: From ‘Odious Crime’ to ‘Gay 
Marriage’, Mr. Cretney analyzes the Civil Partnership Act by discussing the 
history and background relating to the criminalization and subsequent 
decriminalization of homosexual relationships.   
 Chapter one looks at the history of the law relating to sexual 
relationships.  It begins with a brief description of the 1953 trial of three men 
accused of having homosexual sex. This case is used to illustrate the fact that 
as recently as the middle of the Twentieth Century consensual sex between 
people of the same sex was illegal and people were still being prosecuted 
under the law. Later in the 1950s, a committee was entrusted with the 
responsibility of exploring the morality and immorality of both prostitution 
and homosexuality. The subsequent report produced in 1957, the Wolfenden 
Report, recommended that, because homosexual conduct between consenting 
adults was a private matter, it should not be criminalized. The report 
concluded that there were proper areas for government regulation and 
consensual homosexual conduct did not fall within those areas. 
 In the aftermath of this report, the law was changed, although it took 
until 1967 for the passage of the Sexual Offences Act to decriminalize private 
homosexual acts. It took almost forty more years for the law to advance to the 
point where relationships between same-sex partners were themselves given 
legal status. In an interesting twist, the author mentions that the initial bill 
proposing what became the Civil Partnership Act was intended to apply to 
both same-sex couples and heterosexual, cohabiting couples in an attempt to 
give them an equivalent legal status to married couples. As it progressed 
through Parliamentary debates, however, it evolved into covering homosexual 
relationships and left out heterosexual, cohabitating couples. 
 In the second chapter, Mr. Cretney analyzes specific provisions of the 
Civil Partnership Act to show the progress that it made as well as the 
difficulties that it did not solve or address. The Act defines a civil partnership 
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as being formed when a same-sex couple registers as “civil partners.” It sets 
out, in detail, the steps needed for proper registration and the eligibility 
requirements to be able to register. It provides for the process of dissolution as 
well as inheritance, adoption, and property rights. Mr. Cretney states that it 
appears that the “draftsman has trawled through the statute book and, from the 
Explosive Substances Act 1883 through the Law of Property Act 
1925….down to the Sexual Offences Act 2003, the principle seems to have 
been to add a reference to civil partners wherever there is a reference to 
husband and wife.” However, there are differences between a marriage and a 
civil partnership. A prime example is that adultery is not a valid basis for the 
dissolution of a civil partnership, as it is for a marriage. If a same-sex partner 
wants to end the relationship because of a partner’s infidelity, it is for the 
judiciary “to determine what level of sexual fidelity is appropriate for a same 
sex couple and what kind of conduct is inconsistent with that standard.” An 
additional problem is that, because the government specifically stated that the 
Act does not provide for same-sex marriage, the Civil Partnership Act has not 
satisfied everyone.     
 Chapter three begins to explore the wider context of how laws 
relating to same-sex relationships in other countries have been developing. In 
England the law has developed through the legislature. In other countries, the 
courts have been at the forefront to change in the law. Mr. Cretney 
specifically discusses the cases that have changed the law in the United States, 
notably Lawrence v. Texas and Goodridge v. Department of Public Health. 
He also provides an interesting look at the process by which U.S. Supreme 
Court justices are chosen, showing how politically charged the process is. He 
compares it with the judicial selection provisions of England’s Constitutional 
Reform Act of 2005. The Act established a Selection Commission that 
recommends judges for the Supreme Court and a Judicial Appointments 
Commission that makes recommendations for other courts. Since the Act 
specifies that the recommendations are to be on merit alone, the intent is to 
make the process apolitical. However, the author proceeds to discuss how 
merit will be evaluated and what level of judicial review will be allowed to 
the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, given the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty. 
 Same Sex Relationships: From ‘Odious Crime’ to ‘Gay Marriage’ is 
based on three lectures given by Mr. Cretney as part of the Oxford Clarendon 
Lectures in Law in 2005. As the author points out, the text of the book is as it 
was delivered in the lectures. No attempts were made to bring the text up to 
date, or to include any changes in the law or other developments that may 
have occurred between October 2005 and the time of publication. Because the 
text is based on lectures, it is clearly presented and easily understood. 
Footnotes have been added to provide needed references and extra 
2007] BOOK REVIEWS       303 
 
 
explanatory information. Also included in the book are extensive appendices 
that contain the specific provisions of the Civil Partnership Act, the text of the 
Wolfenden Report, and cases from the United States, Canada, and South 
Africa. These are intended to give the reader “an opportunity for a case study 
of different methods of law making” and to provide a look at differing views 
on the “proper role law in relation to sexual activity.”  This book is an 
excellent resource for understanding the Civil Partnership Act through its 
development and history, and would be valuable for anyone interested in the 
area of same-sex relationships and same-sex marriage.   
 
Karin Johnsrud 
Reference Librarian 
Arthur W. Diamond Law Library 
Columbia University School of Law 
 New York, NY USA 
 
 
China’s Legal Reform: Towards the Rule of Law. By Zou Keyuan. Leiden, 
The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2006. Pp. ix, 266. ISBN 90-04-
15232-6. €99.00; US$129.00. 
       
Zou Keyuan is a prolific scholar who has published extensively on 
Chinese and international maritime law.  His latest work, China’s Legal 
Reform: Towards the Rule of Law, is a comprehensive and succinct study of 
how, since the country opened its doors to the world in the late 1970’s, China 
is relinquishing her deeply rooted political and ideological tradition of “ren 
zhi” (人治rule by people) and moving toward building a system of 
government premised on “fa zhi” (法治 rule by law). 
The opening two chapters delineate in detail the historical context in 
which the Chinese legal system has evolved over the last five decades.  This 
section provides a well-documented analysis of how the modern Chinese 
Constitution developed from its infancy between the years 1954 and 1982 to 
its present form.  Beginning in 1983, in a process that continues, a number of 
constitutional amendments were added to balance the pragmatic challenges of 
the economic needs of the country, the ideological struggles within the ruling 
administration, and the dynamics of party politics.  With meticulous research 
Mr. Zou presents interesting and informative details of the historical milieu 
that shaped the present Constitution. 
The middle chapters of the book trace the enactment of a series of 
economic laws and regulations to accommodate the needs of the rapidly 
developing market economy within the Communist framework, as advocated 
by former Premier Deng Xiaoping.  The book also touches upon thorny issues 
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that continue to plague China, i.e., regionalism and widespread corruption, 
compounded by the administrative measures of the legislature to combat these 
problems.  Enactment of these administrative laws and regulations has in turn 
triggered widespread demands for judicial reform. 
In the final chapters, the book looks beyond China’s domestic issues 
to her engagement with international politics and diplomacy.  This last section 
examines China’s human rights record, particularly in relation to the 
controversial penal system “laodong jiaoyang” (劳动教养Reforming the Re-
education through Labour System), and China’s compliance with WTO and 
other major international treaties and agreements 
As the author states in the Preface, the book is “the outcome of the 
first phase of a long-term research project on ‘Legal Reform in China’,” first 
launched in 1998 when he joined the faculty of the East Asian Institute at the 
National University of Singapore.  The chapters of the book consist mostly of 
articles published between 1999 and 2004.  The compilation is well organized 
in a systematic, coherent, and balanced manner. While short on critical in-
depth analysis, the book gives a fair and concise review of the wide range of 
political, ideological, and economic issues that China confronted as she 
transitioned from an isolationist state into an international powerhouse. 
From 2005 to the present, the years following the period covered by this book, 
the actual pace of substantive legal reform in China has been slow and 
sporadic.  At the same time, however, a groundswell of citizen action has 
begun to challenge the powers of the legislature, judiciary, and ruling 
administration.  Myriad issues ranging from subtle legal challenges to spirited 
calls for reform simmer at the grassroots level in both rural and urban regions 
of the country, e.g., the “weiquan” (维权 rights defense) movement, the trial 
and imprisonment of the blind lawyer-activist Chen Guangcheng (陈光诚), 
the controversy preceding the adoption of the Property Rights Law, and the 
call for legal education reforms, just to name a few.  Mr. Zou’s book provides 
well-organized and balanced background reading about the transition of 
China’s legal system in the last five decades up to the year 2005.  For an up-
to-date assessment, however, legal scholars of China are on their own if they 
want the most recent developments of China’s legal apparatus amidst the 
current political and economic landscape of the country.   
 
Evelyn L. Ma 
Asian Law Reference Librarian 
Lillian Goldman Law Library 
Yale Law School 
New Haven, CT USA 
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European Fair Trading Law: The unfair commercial practices directive, by 
Geraint Howells, Hans W. Micklitz, and Thomas Wilhelmsson. London; 
Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2006. Pp. 312. ISBN 0-7546-4589-4. 
£60.00; US$115.00 
 
There is a longstanding debate in the development of consumer policy 
over whether consumers are better served by regulatory measures that prohibit 
unwanted marketing practices outright, or by measures that facilitate informed 
decision making and more efficient consumer markets, letting consumers 
decide what is best for them.  When protecting the consumer’s interest in 
market transactions, Europe is often regarded as more interventionist than the 
United States, which tends to take a more market-enhancing approach to 
consumer law.  Rather than banning unfair commercial practices outright, 
Congress and state legislatures generally favor non-interventionist mandates, 
such as requiring that certain contract terms (e.g., an APR in a credit 
transaction) be conspicuously disclosed2 and prohibiting selling tactics that 
are fraudulent, misleading, or otherwise inhibit informed consumer choices.  
Market-enhancing laws are designed to help consumers make better informed 
decisions, resulting in more efficient market transactions.  A more 
interventionist approach prohibits contract terms and selling practices that 
regulators deem unfair and therefore illegal in all consumer transactions.3  
Although the EU had taken an interventionist approach in other 
directives, most notably the Directive on Unfair Contract Terms in 1993,4 the 
most recent consumer initiative, the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive,5 
is primarily a market-regulating measure designed to foster informed choices.  
The focus of the law is almost entirely on prohibiting deceptive and 
“aggressive” selling behavior that can influence consumer decisions.  This 
Directive is an important step toward harmonizing the law of unfair 
commercial practices throughout Europe, but its primary goal is breaking 
                                                 
2 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 3-316(2) (a merchant disclaiming the implied warranty of 
merchantability must do so conspicuously).  Rent-to-own transactions are another 
example.  Despite effective interest rates exceeding 200% annually, nearly all state 
legislatures permit rent-to-own sales under laws that require the disclosure of certain 
contract terms.  See, e.g., Ind. Code § 24-7-1 to -9 (2006). 
3 Examples would include usury laws that cap interest rates and laws that prohibit 
confession of judgment clauses in consumer credit transactions. 
4 Directive on Unfair Contract Terms, Council Directive 93/13 EEC, 1993 O.J. 
L95/29. 
5 Directive 2005/29/EC concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial 
practices in the internal market, O.J. 2005 L149/22 (hereinafter, the “Directive” or 
“Directive on Unfair Commercial Practices”). 
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down barriers to cross-border sales of goods and services by harmonizing 
unfair trade laws in the twenty-seven EU Members States, thereby promoting 
efficiency in consumer markets.    
The likely effects of the Directive on consumer welfare and cross 
border trade are subjects addressed by Geraint Howells of the United 
Kingdom, Hans W. Micklitz of Germany, and Thomas Wilhelmsson of 
Finland in their extensively researched and well-organized book, European 
Fair Trading Law: The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive.  The authors 
place the Directive in its wider European law context and offer a wealth of 
historical and comparative analysis to guide governments, courts, and 
administrative bodies that will implement the Directive in the coming years.   
Each of the authors study consumer law and policy in a national legal 
system that will be profoundly affected by the legal mandates of the Directive, 
albeit in different ways.  The fair competition laws of Germany, which 
national and local courts have construed aggressively to protect consumer 
rights in a wide variety of commercial sectors, may have to be scaled back by 
the uniform fairness standards imposed by the Directive.   Finland’s tradition 
of strong, interventionist consumer protection may be challenged as too 
unfriendly to outside business interests that seek to penetrate Finnish 
consumer markets with unconventional marketing schemes.  In the United 
Kingdom, the government must deal with the Directive’s general prohibitive 
clause, which has no parallel in national marketing laws and may require a 
major review of the current regulatory regime to ensure national compliance 
with the Directive’s standards.   
1. The Directive’s Place in European Consumer Law 
The Directive is one of the most recent EU initiatives that attempt to 
deal with a fundamental problem in modern life, i.e., the lack of truly 
informed consent in merchant-consumer transactions.  How should courts 
interpret and apply contracts that merchants created but consumers neither 
read nor understand, and in many cases never even knew existed?  Contracts 
have historically been viewed as legitimate creations of private law between 
the contracting parties (therefore justifying the power of the state through 
court enforcement), because they result from consensual undertakings of 
willing participants.6  Although the consent model is still taught in most first-
year Contracts classes, it is widely criticized as neither an adequate 
                                                 
6 See Randy E. Barnett, Perspectives on Contract Law 346 (1995) (“A 
fundamental tenet of the liberal conception of justice is that resources rightfully 
belonging to another may not be taken without the manifested consent of the rights-
holder.”); John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 342-47 (1971). 
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description of, nor a normative justification for, contractual relationships 
between businesses and consumers.7 
Sophisticated commercial parties who negotiate at arms length are 
nearly always held to the written terms of their bargains, and in resolving 
disputes about contract meaning, judges are justifiably reluctant to imply 
limits on contractual autonomy.  In the typical merchant-consumer 
transaction, however, the bargain model is far less descriptive of the actual 
contracting process.  Apart from the most basic terms of the agreement the 
written contract is seldom seen as reflecting a “meeting of the minds” or even 
a tacit agreement between consumer and merchant.  Most consumer 
transactions result in contracts of adhesion where all but the most basic terms 
are neither read by the consumer nor negotiable. 
The problem of defective consent in consumer transactions typically 
elicits three categories of response in an effort to justify enforcement of the 
resulting agreement.  One is to champion measures that create an environment 
in which informed consent is more likely to occur.  Laws calling for 
conspicuous disclosure of contract terms, notice of rights and obligations, 
plain language requirements, and mandatory rescission or cooling-off periods 
all seek to move consumers toward better informed and more voluntary 
undertakings.8  When sellers comply with such a law, courts usually conclude 
that the merchant has complied with its legal duties and the resulting bargain 
is binding on the parties. 
A second category of response is to acknowledge the fiction of true 
consent, even with mandatory disclosures, accept it as unavoidable in the 
modern world, and argue that non-consensual consumer transactions are 
                                                 
7 See Lawrence Kalevitch, Gaps in Contracts: A Critique of Consent 
Theory, 54 Mont. L. Rev. 169 (1993); William W. Bratton, Jr., The “Nexus of 
Contracts” Corporation: A Critical Appraisal, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 407, 458-59 (1989) 
(“Contract law literature contains commentary effectively challenging classical 
contract's conjunction of contract, consent, and freedom.”); Duncan Kennedy, 
The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1349, 
1351-52 (1982) (“The ‘free’ ‘private’ market is really an artifact of public violence.”); 
Betty Mensch, Freedom of Contract as Ideology, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 753, 764 (1981) 
(“Coercion, including legal coercion, lies at the heart of every bargain. Coercion is 
inherent in each party's legally protected threat to withhold what is owned. The right 
to withhold creates the right to force submission to one's own terms.”). 
8 In the early 1990s, Norbert Reich and others labeled this disclosure-based form 
of consumer protection a pre-interventionist approach to the defective consent 
problem.  See Norbert Reich, Diverse Approaches to Consumer Protection 
Philosophy, 14 J. Cons. Pol. 257 (1992) (observing possible exceptions in Spain and 
Brazil); J. Goldring, Consumer Law and Legal Theory: Reflections of a Common 
Lawyer, in Essays on Comparative Commercial and Consumer Law 316, 326-27 (D. 
King, ed., 1992). 
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legitimized in other ways.   Presently, the most widely accepted is rational 
choice and the efficiency of consumer markets.9  A nonconsensual contract is 
just one of many non-negotiable aspects of a product or service being offered 
to the public.   Consumers purchase many products and services without 
knowing many of their physical, experiential, and legal attributes—good, bad, 
or otherwise.   In the sale of a computer, for example, a typical buyer may be 
aware of some software and hardware properties, but far from all of them.  
Similarly, a buyer may be aware of a few contract terms (e.g., a one-year 
warranty) but is only vaguely aware of others.  At time of delivery, the 
computer comes as a bundled, packaged product, and the buyer takes the 
entire bundle, contract and all.    
Observing that contracts are simply one part of a package deal may 
describe consumer contracting in today’s world, but it does not necessarily 
legitimize the contract that the merchant seeks to impose.  Without a 
normative justification to legitimize the private law created in the absence of 
an informed and voluntary agreement, there is no reason why courts should 
not ignore the non-bargained for contract and use default rules found in 
legislation, at common law, or in some other source.    
One normative justification for consumer contracts is essentially fault 
based.  If a consumer chooses to enter into a transaction without reading the 
terms, the consumer takes a risk and the law will not hear the complaint if 
harm later results.  We might say that the consumer waived any legitimacy 
claim by foregoing the opportunity to withhold consent if the consumer 
thought a contract term (e.g., a mandatory arbitration provision in a distant 
locale) or selling practice was unfair.  Fault-based justifications often have 
normative appeal, but only when there is a societal consensus that a person is 
genuinely at fault.  Through personal experience, consumers know that in 
most contracting situations their failure to read, understand, and negotiate 
terms is excusable and even expected.  If someone insisted on reading, 
questioning, and dickering over standard terms in consumer contracts, others 
would likely find the behavior odd and pointless. 
Those who argue for enforcing standard form agreements, therefore, 
seldom use fault-based justifications.  Instead, they argue that if market 
participants behave rationally, market forces will ensure that merchants’ 
forms include efficient terms, whether bargained for or not.10   Market actors 
                                                 
9 See Margaret J. Radin, Humans, Computers, and Binding Commitment, 75 Ind. 
L.J. 1125 (2000);   Maureen A. O'Rourke, Progressing Towards a Uniform 
Commercial Code for Electronic Commerce or Racing Towards Nonuniformity?, 14 
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 635, 648 (1999). 
10  See Russell Krobokin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and 
Unconscionability, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1203. 1206, 1210-11 (2003); Richard Craswell, 
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make choices in their own best interests, and the resulting equilibrium, of 
product attributes and contract terms, is roughly as it should be.   If efficiency 
is accepted as a morally legitimate end, then consumer contracts are morally 
defensible and justifiably enforced in court because the market will ensure 
efficient results.  As Judge Easterbrook wrote in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 
discussing a term in an adhesion licensing contract that appeared inside 
software packaging, “Competition among vendors, not judicial revision of a 
package’s contents, is how consumers are protected in a market economy.”11  
Our consumer markets work reasonably well, but market failures still 
abound, which suggests that the rational choice model may not work in all 
markets for consumer goods and services.   Generally perceived market 
failures include the tendency of markets to concentrate and become less 
competitive over time; the inability of consumers (through lack of cognitive 
ability or issues of saliency) to obtain and process relevant information and 
make intelligent purchasing decisions that will move markets to more 
efficient outcomes; and the difficulties of ensuring effective consumer 
representation in political and judicial spheres, when the business community 
is well organized.12 
When market inefficiencies persist, a third category of response to the 
problem of defective consent is a more interventionist approach.  Consumer 
interventionists posit that disclosure and reliance on market forces are not 
enough.  Non-bargained for terms have no legitimacy if they unreasonably 
favor the merchant over the consumer, and in their place, mandatory terms 
should be imposed after parliamentary debate and participation by competing 
interests.  Legitimacy of the consumer-merchant legal relationship is then re-
established through the democratic process and negotiation by committee, 
rather than by the individual parties themselves.  Indeed, broadly speaking, 
the evolution of law in many fields can be viewed as a movement away from 
consent-based assumptions and ineffective disclosure-based market 
enhancements, and towards mandatory rules imposed by judges or, more 
commonly, by statutory or regulatory imperatives.13  Statute books are filled 
                                                                                                                    
Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller 
Relationships, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 361, 363 (1991). 
11  86 F.3d 1447, 1453 (7th Cir. 1996). 
12 Thierry Bourgoignie, Elements for a Theory of Consumer Law, in Essays on 
Comparative Commercial and Consumer Law 277, 285-86 (D. King, ed., 1992). 
13 Examples are found in virtually all fields: employment (e.g., exceptions to 
employment at will, numerous anti-discrimination laws, and mandatory 
accommodations for workers with disabilities), insurance (e.g., state-imposed 
insurance terms), competition (e.g., restrictions on anti-competitive mergers and 
product tie-ins), landlord-tenant (e.g., court- or legislature-imposed habitability 
requirements, anti-discrimination laws, eviction procedures), to name a few.    
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with laws that impose mandatory terms in relationships that previously had 
been left to market forces and the immediately affected parties to decide for 
themselves. 
Whether government-mandated contracts are more efficient than 
terms produced by market exchange is continually debated, but the practice of 
state interference with private contractual relationships, as a means of 
legitimizing the law governing those relationships, is commonplace.14  In the 
consumer context, laws ban exculpatory clauses deemed unreasonably to 
favor sellers and impose minimum standards of protection for consumers, 
such as minimum warranty and rescission periods.  Despite occasional 
criticism from economists and the business community, the interventionist 
model is accepted today as necessary when markets forces yield outcomes 
that policy makers, and their constituents, are not willing to accept.15 
It might therefore have been disappointing to some consumer 
advocates when the EU adopted the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive in 
2005, which favors a market-regulating approach focusing almost exclusively 
on contracting procedures, rather than substantive terms, and ensuring 
informed consumer decision making.  It should not have been surprising, 
however.  The European Commission proposed the Directive only in part to 
protect consumers from unfair marketing practices.  The main purpose of the 
Directive was to harmonize the unfair trade laws of the EU Member States 
and thus to remove another barrier to cross-border commerce.  More uniform 
                                                 
14 Debates about regulating the sub-prime lending market are a recent example.  
In some states, disclosure of subprime lending fees and corresponding annual 
percentage rates is regarded as sufficient to protect societal interests.  In others, caps 
on fees or outright prohibition of certain lending practices, such as “payday” loans, 
have been legislated.  See Secured Consumer Credit and the Fringe Banking Industry, 
in Secured Transactions Under the Uniform Commercial Code, ch. 20A (J.B. 
McDonnell, ed. 2005) (discussing state and federal laws governing traditional pawns, 
automobile title pawns, “payday” loans, tax refund anticipation loans, and rent-to-
own transactions). 
15 Beginning in the 1960s and continuing through subsequent decades, the 
governments of Europe and North America enacted numerous laws that recognized 
the inadequacy of market mechanisms, competition and freedom of contract to protect 
consumer interests.  For an insightful comparison of the effects of federalism on the 
development of consumer law in Europe and the United States, see Thierry 
Bourgoingnie & David Trubek, Consumer Law, Consumer Markets and Federalism in 
Europe and the United States (1987).  In less developed countries, the most necessary 
consumer laws are likely to be those ensuring the safety of foods and health products, 
not laws mandating information disclosures and other market-regulating devices.  
Hans B. Thorelli, Consumer Policy in Developing Countries, in 29th Annual Meeting 
of the American Council on Consumer Interests 149 (Karen P. Goebel, ed., 1983).   
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trading laws should make it easier for merchants to market goods and services 
throughout Europe.   
Though limited in its scope, the Directive is one of the most 
significant consumer initiatives to emerge from Brussels in recent years, 
largely because it introduces a clause that prohibits unfair trade practices in 
very general terms, which does not exist in some Member States and which 
may result in stronger consumer protection than others now provide.  The 
Directive is also noteworthy because of its “maximum harmonization” 
approach.   Unlike previous consumer initiatives, the Directive restricts 
Member States from enforcing national laws that are more restrictive of 
commercial practices, thus raising concerns that it will weaken consumer 
rights in Member States that have comparatively strong consumer protection 
regimes.    
2. Three Tiers of Prohibited Commercial Conduct 
The Directive prohibits “unfair” commercial practices in transactions 
with consumers.   A practice is unfair if it violates at least one of three tiers of 
prohibited conduct, moving from the specific (a laundry list of prohibited 
practices) to a general clause whose meaning is open to varying 
interpretations.  The first tier is a list of thirty-one specific practices that are 
per se unlawful throughout the EU.  They include marketing tactics such as 
“claiming to be a signatory to a code of conduct when the trader is not,” 
“creating the impression that the consumer cannot leave the premises until a 
contract is formed,” and other specific trade practices that have been 
identified as deceptive or overly aggressive in all circumstances.16  This 
approach is familiar to consumer lawyers in the United States because similar 
lists of prohibited marketing practices are common in many state deceptive 
practices statutes.17 
 The second tier is a more general prohibition of practices that fit 
within the Directive’s definition of “misleading” or “aggressive” practices.   
A practice is misleading if it “is likely to deceive the average consumer . . . or 
is likely to cause him to take a transactional decision that he would not have 
taken otherwise.”18  It is also misleading to omit “material information that 
the average consumer needs, according to the context, to make and informed 
transactional decision.”19  These are similar to the standards used by the 
Federal Trade Commission to determine whether a practice is deceptive under 
                                                 
16 Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, Annex I (“Commercial Practices 
Which Are in All Circumstances Considered Unfair”). 
17 Some form of the Uniform  Deceptive Sales Practices Act, which contains a 
list of prohibited practices, has been enacted in many states. See, e.g., 815 Ill. Comp. 
Stat. § 510, 510/2 (2006). 
18 Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, Article 6.1. 
19 Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, Article 7.1. 
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Section 5 of the FTC Act,20 and by courts interpreting state deceptive 
practices acts that follow FTC precedent, as many do.21 
 A prohibited “aggressive” practice occurs if, by means of 
“harassment, coercion or undue influence, [it] is likely to significantly impair 
the average consumer’s freedom of choice or conduct . . . and thereby causes 
him or is likely to cause him to take a transactional decision that he would not 
have taken otherwise.”22  This concept has no direct corollary in the FTC Act, 
but it may roughly correspond to the concept of “unfairness” in Section 5.  
“Aggressive” sales tactics may not be as broad a concept, however, because 
the Directive only addresses practices that impair a consumer’s freedom of 
choice or ability to make decisions.  Overbearing door-to-door sales tactics 
might be an example.  Other types of unfair conduct might not be covered.23 
 The third and most controversial tier is the general clause, which 
prohibits a commercial practice that is “contrary to the requirements of 
professional diligence” and “is likely to distort the economic behaviour with 
regard to the product of the average consumer whom it reaches or to whom it 
is addressed.”24  “Professional diligence” means the standard that a trader 
“may reasonably be expected to exercise towards consumers, commensurate 
with honest market practice and/or the general principle of good faith.”25  A 
practice “materially distorts the economic behaviour of consumers” if it 
“appreciably impair[s] the consumer’s ability to make an informed 
decision.”26  Combining the two, the general clause appears to combine 
principles of good faith and fair dealing that are familiar to lawyers in the 
United States.  These are very flexible concepts, of course, and their 
application in the twenty-seven EU Member States is uncertain.  
                                                 
20 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).  See F.T.C. v. Pantron I Corp., 33 F. 3d 1088, 1095 (9th 
Cir. 1994)(a material representation or omission is deceptive if it is likely to mislead a 
consumer acting reasonably under the circumstances). 
21 See, e.g., State ex rel. McLeod v. C & L Corp., 280 S.C. 519, 525, 313 S.E.2d 
334, 338 (1983). 
22 Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, Article 8. 
23 For example, sale of financial information obtained through pretexting, F.T.C. 
v. Rapp., No. 99-WM-783, 1999 F.T.C. LEXIS 112 (D. Colo. filed Apr. 12, 1999) 
(stipulated consent agreement and final order entered June 23, 2000) (Touch Tone); 
use of information obtained in violation of a competitor's privacy policy to spam 
consumers, F.T.C. v. ReverseAuction.com, Inc., No. 00-0032 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 6, 
2000) (available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/01/reverseconsent.htm ); and charging 
consumers for non-existent Internet services, F.T.C. v. J.K. Publications, 99 F. Supp. 
2d 1176 (C.D. Ca. 2000). 
24 Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, Article 5.2(a) and (b). 
25 Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, Article 2(h). 
26 Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, Article 2(e). 
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Consequently, the authors devote an entire chapter to analysis of the general 
clause alone.27 
 3. Enforcement Issues 
 All EU consumer protection directives deal with enforcement issues 
only marginally, and the matter of individual enforcement by consumers (for 
money damages or injunctive relief) is usually not addressed at all.28  Under 
general principles of EU law, Member States are responsible for 
implementing directives and including effective enforcement mechanisms, so 
long as those mechanisms give full effect to the mandates of the directive and 
give parties with standing effective legal protection.   Decisions of the 
European Court of Justice emphasize the duties of Member States in this 
regard and seldom encroach on Member State autonomy when it comes to 
choosing effective remedies that implement a directive’s legal mandates.29   
 The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, however, includes a bit 
more concrete direction on enforcement issues, while leaving considerable 
flexibility to the Member States in deciding how to carry out those 
directions.30  For example, the Directive tells Member States to give standing 
to “persons or organizations regarded under national law as having a 
legitimate interest in combating unfair commercial practices,” but it allows 
enforcement by those persons or organizations to be through either court or 
administrative processes.31  A Member State need not allow individuals to 
seek money damages in court.  Because the Directive is not the first to address 
consumer rights in market transactions, similar enforcement issues have 
already been decided in other contexts.  Thus, enforcement mechanisms that 
are already in place to enforce fair trading laws in other contexts should be 
available to enforce this Directive as well.32   
 By referencing actions brought by “persons or organizations,” the 
Directive leaves open the possibility of collective enforcement actions, and 
even class actions in some form, but it does not mandate them if they are not 
already allowed under national law.  Member States can decide if collective 
redress is limited to government enforcement agencies, or whether consumer 
groups and trade organizations have legal standing as well.33 
4. The Directive’s Maximum Harmonization Approach 
Harmonization is the process of creating similar legal rules in all EU 
Member States.  “Maximum” harmonization occurs when a directive creates 
                                                 
27  European Fair Trading Law, ch. 4. 
28 European Fair Trading Law at 220. 
29 See, e.g., Palmisani v. INPS, Case C-261/95, 1 E.C.R. 4025 (1997). 
30 Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, Articles 11, 12, and 13. 
31 Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, Article 11(1). 
32 European Fair Trading Law at 223-25. 
33 European Fair Trading Law at 222. 
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legal mandates that cannot be exceeded by Member States.  It is roughly 
analogous to the concept of federal preemption in the United States, but many 
of the consumer protection laws in the United States do not preempt state law 
on the subject.  They set a minimum level of consumer protection, and states 
are free to provided greater protection if they so choose.  Similarly, the EU 
Commission had previously strived for “minimal” harmonization in the field 
of consumer law, which set a base level of protection that Member States 
could choose to exceed, although the Commission was showing signs of 
shifting its approach in recent years.34  Consequently, when the Directive was 
being debated, one of the central points of discussion was the European 
Commission’s decision to make it a maximum harmonization directive.35   
Maximum harmonization means that Member States are not permitted 
to enact or enforce laws that are more restrictive on the free movement of 
goods and services than the Directive allows.  In other words, Member States 
cannot enact or enforce laws that create a higher level of consumer protection 
if doing so could impede the sale of goods or services across borders.  
Consumer organizations protested to no avail the maximum harmonization 
approach because they did not want the Directive to weaken stronger 
consumer laws that exist in some Member States.36  The Commission 
successfully argued that European firms should not have to adjust their 
marketing practices across borders to comply with the vagaries of national 
laws.  A European standard of unfair commercial practices would encourage 
trade across borders, and maximum harmonization was critical to this end.37   
The Commission’s maximum harmonization approach may have 
limited effect, however, because a wide variety of unfair practices can be 
attacked under the general clause, and even under the second tier that 
prohibits “misleading” and “aggressive” practices broadly defined.  There is 
                                                 
34 European Fair Trading Law at 28-29, 35. 
35 Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, Article 4, which states, “Member 
States shall neither restrict the freedom to provide services nor restrict the free 
movement of goods for reasons falling within the field approximated by this 
Directive.”  Although this language is rather obtuse to readers unfamiliar with EU 
drafting conventions, it means that Member States cannot create laws on unfair trade 
practices that restrict commercial activity more than the Directive does. 
36 See National Consumer Council, United Kingdom, Unfair Commercial 
Practices: Response to DTI Consultation on the Draft EU Directive (2003); European 
Consumer Law Group, The Proposed Directive on Unfair Commercial Practices 
(2004). 
37 European Fair Trading Law at 35.  The Directive does provide for a transition 
period, however, in which Member States may apply more restrictive laws through 
June 12, 2013, if certain conditions are met.  Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, 
Article 3(5). 
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plenty of room for different interpretations of these critical clauses among the 
Member States.  While it is true that Member States cannot apply national 
laws in a manner that restricts trade more than the Directive allows, national 
courts and administrative tribunals may create varying standards for 
acceptable commercial conduct on a case-by-case basis.  For example, the 
concept of “professional diligence” under the general clause may be 
interpreted differently from state to state so that a trade practice that is legal in 
one state will be banned in another.38  To the extent that this occurs, the 
harmonization goal will be undermined and barriers to cross-border marketing 
will remain.   The European Court of Justice can promote harmonization 
through case law as it resolves disputes that challenge a Member State’s trade 
laws as contrary to the Directive’s mandates.  The Court’s jurisdiction is 
limited, however, to cases brought by the Commission and referrals from 
national courts, so national consumer protection agencies and tribunals in 
Member States will be primarily responsible for implementing the Directive 
in a way that is consistent with other Member States.  If they reach different 
conclusions on similar issues, harmonization will be lost. 
5. Areas of Consumer Concern 
The authors criticize the Directive on several fronts, although only a 
few will be discussed here.  One area of concern is the Directive’s focus on 
protecting the “average” consumer, not the most vulnerable, credulous, or 
trusting consumer.39  Recital 18 defines the average consumer as someone 
who is “reasonably well-informed and reasonably observant and 
circumspect.”40  This may exclude a large number of consumers who are 
frequent victims of unscrupulous marketing practices.  While a trader should 
not be held liable if its marketing message is taken literally when it is clearly 
unreasonable to do so, many riches have been gained at the expense of people 
who are not reasonably well informed or observant.  Indeed, the most 
vulnerable may have the greatest need for protection in the law.  The 
Directive does provide that one should take “into account social, cultural and 
linguistic factors,” but it is not clear that this language could be used to 
protect the most credulous consumers in Member States.41 
                                                 
38 European Fair Trading Law at 100-01. 
39  European Fair Trading Law at 111. 
40  Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, Recital 18.  This has been an issue in 
the United States as well.  The Directive’s focus on the “average” consumer  may not 
be materially different from the standard that the FTC uses, banning misleading 
practices only if they are likely to mislead consumers “acting reasonably under the 
circumstances.”  F.T.C. v. Pantron I Corp., 33 F. 3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 1994). 
41 Recital 18 also states, “Where a commercial practice is specifically aimed at a 
particular group of consumers, such as children, it is desirable that the impact of the 
commercial practice be assessed from the perspective of the average member of that 
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The authors also note that the Directive omits a “safeguard” clause 
that would have permitted Member States to enact more restrictive laws if 
unexpected events rendered the mandates of the Directive outdated or ill-
advised.42  A safeguard clause could have weakened the maximum 
harmonization principle because it would have given Member States leeway 
to opt out of the Directive in emergency circumstances, but it also would have 
allowed Member States to react to unusual developments that the drafters of 
the Directive did not envision.  Traders can be creative, exploit loopholes, and 
push legal rules to their limits.  A safeguard clause, which was included in the 
General Product Safety Directive43 and the E-Commerce Directive,44 might 
have been a sensible precaution. 
Most notably, the authors question the effect of the general clause, 
which prohibits a commercial practice that is “contrary to the requirements of 
professional diligence” and “is likely to distort the economic behaviour with 
regard to the product of the average consumer whom it reaches or to whom it 
is addressed.”45  Some civil law Member States had already enacted general 
clauses that limit unfair commercial practices,46 but they use varying language 
and national legal institutions have applied them in different ways.47  Even 
though the Directive adopts the basic form of general clause that appears in 
the laws of a few Member States, differences in culture persist as to what are 
acceptable commercial practices in those Member States, so it is not clear 
what effect, if any, the Directive will have in those locales.  Moreover, 
Germany and the Nordic states have traditionally been highly protective of 
consumers, so it is possible that their stronger limitations on commercial 
practices will have to be scaled back if they are not covered by the more 
specific prohibitions of the Directive and do not fit within the confines of the 
general clause.  The United Kingdom and Ireland do not have a general 
clause, relying instead on a legion of conduct-specific prohibitions, so the 
                                                                                                                    
group.”  While this language does allow Member States to protect vulnerable and 
credulous consumers, it does so only if the marketing is directed at that subgroup, and 
not at the public at large.  Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, Recital 18. 
42 European Fair Trading Law at 31-36. 
43 Article 3(4), Directive 2001/95/EC on general product safety, O.J. 2002 L11/4. 
44 Article 3(4), Directive 2003/31/EC on certain aspects of information society 
services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market, 2000 O.J. L178/1. 
45 Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, Article 5.2(a) and (b). 
46 European Fair Trading Law at 3. 
47 Reiner Schulze and Hans Schulte-Nolke, Analysis of National Fairness Laws 
Aimed at Protecting Consumers in Relation to Commercial Practices, at 12, available 
at: 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/green_pap_
comm/studies/unfair_practices_en.pdf>. 
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Directive’s impact in those Member States is unclear.48  Consequently, the 
reach of the general clause is uncertain, and it will take years to see if 
Member States interpret it in similar ways. 
6. Assessing the Directive’s Impact 
The authors conclude that the Directive is among the most important 
consumer protection initiatives in the EU to date, but they are concerned 
about its impact on consumer laws across Europe.  To the extent that the 
harmonization goal succeeds, European fair trading rules may be more 
uniform but they might not be as consumer friendly as the rules that now exist 
in some Member States.49  Consumer advocates will be looking to see if the 
European Court of Justice strikes down national consumer laws that impede 
cross-border trade if they are not clearly authorized by the Directive.   
Practical obstacles may limit the harmonization goal, however.50  
National traditions and social understandings of fairness are bound to affect 
legislative and judicial outcomes.  If the Court of Justice allows Member 
States to interpret their fair trade laws broadly to enforce a wide array of 
idiosyncratic trade restrictions, the Directive will have limited effect and its 
primary purpose will be frustrated.  For the Member States that have no 
general clause, it will be a huge task to modify existing conduct-specific 
legislation to ensure consistency with the mandates of the Directive,51 and one 
wonders whether the task will be undertaken vigorously.  If it is not, the 
Commission faces an equally difficult task to monitor that progress and see 
that the Directive has been implemented properly in those Member States.   
Maximum harmonization of some commercial practices laws might be 
necessary and in some cases desirable, but an attempt to harmonize the entire 
field may have come too soon in the evolution of European integration.  The 
introduction of a common general clause on fair trading creates a base level of 
protection and a mechanism for developing a European-wide concept of fair 
trading, but the field of commercial activity may be so multi-faceted that all 
problems cannot be resolved coherently by a single law on the subject.   
Consumer laws in the United States still vary greatly among state and local 
jurisdictions, and Europe is much more diverse.  At least in the short term, the 
Directive will more likely increase legal complexity in this area of the law 
rather than simplify it.  If that proves to be true, it would not be the first or last 
                                                 
48 European Fair Trading Law at 3.  
49 European Fair Trading Law at 242-44, 248-49. 
50 European Fair Trading Law at 254. 
51 European Fair Trading Law at 255.  Christian Twigg-Flenser, Deborah Parry, 
Geraint Howells & Annette Nordhausen, An Analysis of the Application and Scope 
of the UCP Directive (2005), available at: 
<http://www.dti.gov.uk/ccp/consultpdf/final_report180505.pdf>. 
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time that policy makers tried and failed to create a simple solution to a 
complex legal problem. 
 
James P. Nehf 
Professor of Law and Cleon H. Foust Fellow 
Indiana University School of Law 
Indianapolis, IN USA 
 
 
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law. Edited by Mathias Reimann and 
Reinhard Zimmermann. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. 
Pp.xxi, 1456. ISBN 0-19-       929606-5. £125.00; US$220.00.  
 
The publication of this work in 2006 as a one-volume compendium of 
comparative law, covering history, theory, and example, opens the entire field 
of comparative law to a new generation of law students and scholars.  It 
belongs on the shelves of all major legal and general academic libraries, and 
many others, and should be standing together with other recent or recently 
updated core titles in the field, such as K. Zweigert and H. Kötz, Introduction 
to Comparative Law (3rd ed. trans. Tony Weir. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1998) (hereinafter Zweigert and Kötz), and H. Patrick Glenn, Legal 
Traditions Of The World: Sustainable Diversity In Law (2nd ed., Oxford; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2004)(hereinafter Glenn).  While the title 
under review invites comparison with these important works, it stands apart in 
several important ways that make it a unique contribution to a complex field. 
First, the study is divided into three principal sections containing 
essays written by a very impressive list of scholars; indeed, it is a 
collaborative effort reflecting views of many of the most influential writers in 
the field active after the Second World War. The beginning section follows an 
introduction by Charles Donahue of Harvard, “Comparative Law before the 
Code Napoléon,” and proceeds to tell the story of the development of 
comparative law as a focus of scholarship from perspectives within major 
jurisdictions and regions of the world. This is a unique perspective and 
provides an invaluable guide for librarians and scholars in its careful attention 
to the history of legal education in those jurisdictions as well as the role of 
comparative law within them. Best of all, the essays in this section list major 
authors and works that have advanced the study of comparative law generally 
and in particular from within that legal culture, with more or less initial 
success or acceptance.   
German scholarship played a leading role in the rise of comparative 
methodologies, as is fairly well known.  This role followed rather naturally 
from work on the civil codes of Germany and Switzerland via grand debates 
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about historical versus natural law, the role of Roman law, and other related 
issues. There is particularly valuable information on the role of Ernst Rabel 
(in the section on Germany, Switzerland, and Austria), the founding of 
UNIDROIT, and an unflinching account of what happened to many scholars 
both during and after the Nazi period in Germany. However, the 
establishment of the Max Planck Society institutes, Konrad Zweigert’s role in 
the project to create the ongoing International Encyclopedia of Comparative 
Law, and the work of German scholars on uniform and harmonized private 
law have left a legacy of leadership by this jurisdiction in the field of 
comparative law. 
American, Asian, East European, African customary, and Islamic 
contributions to the development of comparative law within their distinctive 
traditions is not only unique, but prepares the way for the second section on 
the theory of comparative law and its methodologies, such as taxonomies, 
transplants and reception theories, and theories of relationships among legal 
traditions (as opposed to static properties of a legal system). This section 
provides a set of essays that would bring the researcher up to date on the 
thinking of H. Patrick Glenn, Vivian Curran, and others who have contributed 
excellent essays that summarize major themes in their own writings about the 
purpose of comparative law.  Themes from other comparative knowledge 
inquiries, such as language and religion, are brought in to suggest how 
comparison works in literary and historical contexts other than, or along with, 
law. 
Finally, a collection of essays on several specific subject areas 
completes the tripartite division of the book.  Again, some of the best minds 
have been brought together, such as the late Allan Farnsworth (in a last essay) 
on contract law, Mark Tushnet on comparative constitutional law, and editor 
Mathias Reimann on comparative law and private international law. 
This work seems to be more theoretical and bibliographically oriented 
than Zweigert and Kötz, which remains an excellent and accessible 
introduction and a descriptive book, alerting new researchers to features of the 
major systems, now including Islamic, Hindu, Chinese and Japanese law as 
well as English based common law and civil law.  Multiculturalism and 
controversy over Eurocentrism and taxonomy are less important in that earlier 
work than history and description. As a result, this new Oxford Handbook fills 
a gap by providing details about the context for the development of 
comparative law and attempts by some to make it a “science.” I would have 
titled the Handbook “Concise Encyclopedia” or even have placed it within the 
Oxford “Companion to…” series rather than “handbook.” That handbook 
purpose seems already well served by the Zweigert and Kötz approach, even 
with its equally acceptable title as an “introduction.” 
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Similarly, Professor Glenn’s “legal traditions” and “common laws” 
contributions to the comparative law project stand apart in their exploration of 
the complex interrelationships historically and culturally among many 
different legal regimes, often in place simultaneously in some modern 
multicultural jurisdictions. The modern experiment of creating the national 
legal state as a uniform entity may turn out to be the anomaly rather than the 
norm. This work complements and does not replace this title or the still 
invaluable Zweigert and Kötz. 
In short, all of the recent contributions to this newly relevant field 
deserve attention and make valuable contributions to comparative law, but 
this edition by Reimann and Zimmermann supplies a rich bibliographic 
history of scholarship and a wealth of perspectives to guide the field into the 
future through what is hoped may be successive editions.   
  
Marylin J. Raisch 
Associate Law Librarian for International and Foreign Law 
John Wolff International & Comparative Law Library 
Georgetown Law Center 
Washington, D.C. USA 
 
 
Managing the Modern Law Firm: New Challenges, New Perspectives. 
Edited by Laura Empson. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. 
Pp. xi, 238. ISBN 978-0-19-929674-3. £40.00; US$74.00. 
 
This book reflects the continuing interest on the part of academics in 
the function and structure of professional services firms.  In 2001, the 
University of Glasgow Business School collaborated with the Law Society of 
Scotland in a study of solicitor-mangers at a group of Scottish firms.  
Academic interest then began to focus on large international law firms, 
coincident with the ascendance of London’s Magic Circle, the five leading 
“mega firms.”  Editor Laura Empson is a lecturer at Oxford University’s Saïd 
Business School.  Her collaborators in this book include professors from the 
graduate business schools at Harvard, Northwestern, and New York 
University, and senior partners at Clifford Chance and Linklaters.  Together, 
they employ an interdisciplinary approach drawing upon the latest research 
into the state of the legal services market, organizational behavior, business 
strategy, human resources, and information technology, all in an attempt to 
address the scale, complexity, and unique challenges associated with running 
large law firms.   
 Perhaps this book’s most provocative proposition is that the 
partnership model, the very organizational basis for law and other 
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professional services firms, is ripe for replacement during the coming decade.  
Indeed, law firms have been among the last to retain this model; consultancy 
McKinsey & Company, though still privately held, jettisoned partnership in 
the 1950s, and in 1999 investment bank Goldman Sachs went public through 
a listing of a portion of the company on the New York Stock Exchange.  The 
arguments for retaining the partnership model are well known to practicing 
lawyers: it enhances the training of new lawyers through apprenticeship rather 
than through the management model that corporations use; it implies the 
ongoing oversight that the partners exercise among themselves, which tends 
to keep any free riders and shirkers in their ranks to a minimum; and it 
promotes autonomy of judgment, a quality corporate-style governance often 
undermines.  The most compelling argument against partnership is that an 
increasingly competitive business environment implies a need for executive 
leadership, with its identifiable locus of decision-making and clear chain of 
command, rather than consensus.   
Some jurisdictions still mandate the partnership model for law firms, 
reasoning that the unlimited liability of the partners helps ensure that the 
public is exposed to the highest service and ethical standards.  (There is 
currently no market for the public listing of law firm and this would also 
present an ethical dilemma to the degree that such a listing would place 
lawyers under the supervision on non-lawyers.)  But partnership, in the 
opinion of most of the authors, is on its way out.  In its stead a new model, a 
hybrid between the traditional and the new, will likely arise, attempting to 
blend the collegiality of partnership with the revenue focus of the modern 
company.  In short, a model that retains the partnership ethos under a different 
governance structure and uses that ethos as a counterpoise to the stresses 
attendant with competing in a global environment. 
 In addition to these predicted changes in governance, the different 
authors seem to agree that law firms need to begin to assess the productivity 
of partners, associates, and staff, as well as attempt to value quantitatively 
everything from firm/client relationships to human and social capital.  And it 
is suggested that, as with partnership in the governance area, the billable hour 
as the basic revenue unit is likely to come under scrutiny.  Although seen as 
innovative when introduced in the 1950s, the billable hour was just one in a 
series of revenue units lawyers have employed historically.  The fixed-fee 
regime was in place for many years and was often required by the various 
state Bar associations in the United States.  However, a 1975 Supreme Court 
decision abolished all minimum-fee schedules on the grounds that these 
violated the anti-trust laws.  This decision was felicitous, since the shift to the 
billable hour was meant to reflect the increasing complexity and time-
intensiveness of modern legal work, and consequently to halt the decline in 
revenues that many practitioners had attributed to fixed fees. 
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 One of the more intriguing aspects the book addresses is a firm’s 
status affiliation, and how this affects revenue.  An intangible like so many 
other facets of legal practice, it yet has real implications for the bottom line.  
For instance, an American firm’s Martindale-Hubble entry, its ranking in the 
National Law Journal, or whether any of its partners feature in The Best 
Lawyers in America, all speak to the firm’s brand equity and might be used as 
inputs in justifying the firm’s fees.  Another relevant finding concerns the way 
a firm’s social ties in the business community relate to its income.  For 
instance, billing rates stemming from these social relationships may be lower 
per unit, but work from the client is often steadier and typically translates into 
higher annual gross revenue for the firm.  Cognizance of these sorts of 
differences helps a manager or managing partner limn the competitive space 
between his firm and others. 
 This book should impel lawyers to consider afresh what it means to 
exercise leadership and management at their firms, and how all the firm’s 
activities might be rationalized to deliver optimal value to the customer and 
add to revenue.  The area of scholarship this book represents is increasingly 
topical; Oxford University Press alone has four related titles in print.  Any of 
them ought to complement this volume nicely, and all should be useful 
additions to libraries serving law and business schools, or law firms. 
 
Scott Rasmussen52 
Sausalito, CA USA 
 
 
Mapping the Law: Essays in Memory of Peter Birks. Edited by Andrew 
Burrows and Lord Rodger of Earlsferry. Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2006. Pp. vii, 675. ISBN 0-19-920655-4. £60.00; 
US$105.00. 
 
 The sad circumstance of the early loss of one of the legal academy’s 
most engaged and engaging personalities is the occasion for this collection of 
essays, articles, works in progress, and tributes by his colleagues, former 
students, and admirers. Peter Birks was Regius Professor of Civil Law at 
Oxford University at the time of his death at 62 from cancer in 2004. He was 
among the most prolific British legal scholars and, as his friend and colleague 
Jack Beatson, former professor of English law at Cambridge and presently 
Justice of the High Court, notes in an obituary for a British newspaper, Birks 
“was a superb doctrinal lawyer, a passionate and inspirational teacher, and . . . 
a key figure in the extraordinary development of the law of restitution in the 
                                                 
52 Mr. Rasmussen is a legal editor and translator. 
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last 45 years.”53 The reader of only a sample of contributions to this volume 
will find these opinions confirmed and compounded. It is evident that Birks 
was an entirely charismatic jurist, whose affection and ambitions for law and 
legal history were infectious. On the evidence of this work, they remain so. 
 Those not persuaded by the testimony of his friends appearing in a 
collection expressly designed to celebrate Birks’ personal and professional 
legacy need only turn to his own writing, which is replete with anecdote, 
caricature, wry comment, exact analysis, aphorism, and almost poetically 
figurative diction. For example, Birks constellates the fewer than twenty 
pages comprising his Foreword and Introduction to his edition of the two-
volume English Private Law54 with instances of these stylistic elements as he 
describes the problem of legal information overload and recommends with 
scholastic intensity the need for rational order to address it. Legal 
specialization, he remarks, leads young practitioners to:  
 
know their law only in the way that many people know 
London, as pools of unconnected light into which to emerge 
from a limited number of friendly tube stations. Prescriptions 
for this condition are sometimes quite bizarre. One proposal, 
apparently seriously made, was that law schools should 
consider abolishing categories. Categories are abolished only 
in the last stages of Alzheimer’s disease. (pp. xxxv-xxxvi) 
 
Birks was an adamant categorizer, and taught that the 
solution to a legal problem entails construction of a rigorous 
taxonomy (even if that means including a miscellaneous catch-all 
category) and never failing to lose sight of its structuring principles. 
Put another way, he wrote, “the truth is that a practitioner will 
practise better if he can see a map of the whole law and can take a 
firm grip on the concepts and principles which fit its various parts 
together.”55  Here appears an instance, and certainly not the only one, 
of Birks’ use of the map metaphor that would serve as the key figure 
for the present volume’s title. 
                                                 
53 Jack Beatson, Peter Birks: Brilliant and Prolific Academic Lawyer Who 
Brought the Law of Restitution Up to Date, GUARDIAN (London), July 16, 2004, at 
31. 
54 ENGLISH PRIVATE LAW, ed. Peter Birks (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000). 
55 Birks elsewhere apologizes for the volumes’ recourse to the masculine 
pronoun. MAPPING THE LAW, at xxxii. 
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Although Birks had hopeful and high ambitions for “a structural 
overview”56 of English law, private and public, the contributions to Mapping 
the Law largely pertain to his own particular areas of expertise, with which 
many academics and practitioners will not necessarily be familiar. Judging the 
book by the title, a prospective reader might expect something like “a map of 
the whole law,” but in fact only three or four areas of law are nominally 
represented: English and comparative unjust enrichment law, Roman law, and 
legal history.  Nevertheless, Birks’ holistic approach to analysis assures that 
the contributions even to these relatively narrowly circumscribed categories 
will include bridges to others.  Furthermore, a successful map of the law 
doesn’t necessarily assure order.  An accurate map will delimit the swamps 
and thickets.  Birks did not shy from identifying them, and his cartography 
occasionally worked to prescribe routes through or around them. 
The first and longest of the volume’s four parts, “The English Law of 
Unjust Enrichment and Restitution,” commences with a historical account by 
Prof. Francis Rose of “The Evolution of the Species,” i.e., of Anglo-American 
unjust enrichment law.  (In his introduction to English Private Law, Birks 
notes with admiration Darwin’s achievements at classification of the natural 
world.57) Rose describes the context of law and academic milieu in which 
Birks pursued his career, interspersing biographical, professional, and 
jurisprudential developments, which were in some cases to merge. Birks’ 
scholarly advances occasionally appeared as informative authority in rulings 
from English courts on the evolving doctrine. 
Birks infamously capped his unfortunately abbreviated career with 
the post-mortem publication of a second edition of his then only two-year-old 
treatise on unjust enrichment.  In the new edition, he proposed a wholesale 
revision of his former ideas.  Rose is not the only contributor to the volume to 
remark upon Birks’ notoriety for changing his mind, a potentially aggravating 
quality for which he is admired.  It reflects his intellectual integrity and the 
skepticism to which he subscribed despite his drive to state the law in 
unambiguous, precise terms.  He was also forthright about his capacity for 
self-revision.  In the contribution following Rose’s addressing “The New 
Birksian Scheme” of “absence of basis” as the factor determining which cases 
of enrichment are unjust, Prof. Andrew Burrows remarks that “it was entirely 
in character that . . . he should portray his change of mind as a conversion of 
                                                 
56 1 ENGLISH PUBLIC LAW, supra note 2, at xlix. 
57 Id. at l. 
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the most dramatic kind.  Only he could have written that ‘almost everything 
of mine now needs calling back for burning’.”58 
A bonfire of books and articles, a dramatic conversion, the London 
underground, Darwin, dementia… These are not among the themes or images 
one would ordinarily anticipate at the prospect of reading the minutiae of 
unjust enrichment law.  Yet they fairly represent the typically animated 
figures in Birks’ writing and, appropriately, in some of the tributes included in 
this volume.  A colleague, Dr. Arianna Pretto-Sakmann devotes her chapter to 
an interpretation of Roman legal texts pertaining to swarms of bees.59  Prof. 
John Baker uses as examples for his “Chapter in the History of the Tort of 
Deceit” cases involving three kinds of stones: “Bezoar-Stones, Gall-Stones, 
and Gem-Stones.”60  This aspect of the volume, its attention to and flattering 
imitation of its honoree’s literary and pedagogical styles, serves to render it a 
fascinating and informative resource, instructive both about Birks’ life and 
work, and about the legal issues on which he and the contributors focus.  
As noted, the first part dealing with unjust enrichment and restitution 
is the longest of the four, reflecting (along with the comparative perspectives 
of unjust enrichment comprising the second part) the area of law for which 
Birks perhaps earned his greatest celebrity.61  It is subdivided, following Prof. 
                                                 
58 Andrew Burrows, Absence of Basis: The New Birksian Scheme, in MAPPING 
THE LAW 33-48, 33 (quoting PETER BIRKS, UNJUST ENRICHMENT, 2d ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005) xii. 
59 Arianna Pretto-Sakmann, ‘You Never Can Tell with Bees’: Good Advice from 
Pooh for Students of the Lex Aquilia, in MAPPING THE LAW 475-96. 
60 John Baker, Bezoar-Stones, Gall-Stones, and Gem-Stones: A Chapter in the 
History of the Tort of Deceit, in MAPPING THE LAW 545-59. 
61 Birks strongly opposed the traditional confusion of unjust enrichment and 
restitution, noting that the former is the event which precipitates the latter as a legal 
response. See, e.g., 2 ENGLISH PUBLIC LAW, supra note 2, at 526 (“Unjust enrichment 
at the expense of another is an event. A right to restitution is the law’s response to that 
event.”). He titled the chapter in ENGLISH PUBLIC LAW and the two editions of his late 
treatise exclusively after the event to put the topic on an equal footing with “the 
cognate categories of contract and tort,” both triggering events in law. Id. In his 
account of the competing maps of the territory occupied by unjust enrichment, Birks 
lamented the approach taken by the work yet in progress RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW 
THIRD, RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT (Philadelphia, PA: American Law 
Institute, 2001-), for which the Reporter is Prof. Andrew Kull, Boston University 
School of Law. Birks writes, “Professor Kull is now in a position to give us at long 
last a law of unjust enrichment. Yet the signs are that he will not. He will probably 
persist in the American preference for a law of gain-based recovery, which includes 
but is larger than the law of unjust enrichment properly so-called.” Peter B.H. Birks, 
A Letter to America: The New Restatement of Restitution, 3 GLOBAL JURIST, no.2 
(2003) http://www.bepress.com/gj/frontiers/vol3/iss2/art2. 
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Rose’s initial piece, into three clusters of chapters relating respectively to 
general concepts, unjust factors, and property and insolvency.  The general 
concepts include issues relating to defenses, such as change of position, 
subrogation, tracing, and, already noted, absence of basis, the new approach 
Birks took to determining when enrichment would be unjust. Formerly, he 
argued that enrichment was unjust where certain identifiable “unjust factors” 
compromising a party’s voluntary participation in a transaction—such as 
mistake of fact, duress, undue influence, or payments received ultra vires by a 
public authority—resulted in one party’s enrichment at the expense of 
another.  This is the theory he showed signs of abandoning even three years 
before its fullest elaboration in the first edition of Unjust Enrichment.62  In his 
chapter on unjust enrichment for English Private Law in 2000, for example, 
he noted the “taxonomic disruption” caused by attempting to force the 
concept of absence of basis into a category of unjust factor.63  
The second subdivision of part one includes discussion of some of 
these traditional doctrinal factors, while the third subdivision contributions 
broach restitutionary ramifications of resulting trusts, unjust delivery of 
goods, and insolvency proceedings.  One chapter in this last subdivision 
consists largely of transcripts of Lord Peter Millett’s correspondence with 
Birks reflecting their disagreement over a Court of Appeal ruling to which 
Lord Millett had lodged an opinion.  The dispute depicts the importance of 
distinguishing unjust enrichment (in this case, arguably, the profits earned by 
a wife who invested her bankrupt husband’s money) from property (the 
money owed to creditors but surreptitiously withdrawn by the husband from 
his account and given to his wife). 
The authors in this first part take up disputes they had with Birks (one 
author admitting that his essay emanates from a “being-disagreed-with” by 
Birks64) and problems not fully addressed by Birks’ own work.  A memorial 
or festschrift is, of course, not the ideal resource for an introduction to a topic 
such as the English law of unjust enrichment.  For that, see Birks’ chapter in 
English Private Law, his post-mortem treatise, or one of the several editions 
of the core work on the topic cited in this volume, Goff and Jones’ Law of 
Restitution.65 
The second part, “The Comparative Law of Unjust Enrichment and 
Restitution,” examines German and, in one chapter, Scots legal responses to 
questions Birks strove to resolve.  One contributor, Dr. Sonja Meier, was the 
                                                 
62 PETER BIRKS, UNJUST ENRICHMENT (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
63 2 ENGLISH PUBLIC LAW 567. 
64 David Ibbetson, Sir William Jones and the Nature of Law, in MAPPING THE 
LAW 619-39. 
65 ROBERT GOFF & GARETH H. JONES, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION, 7th ed. 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2007). 
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student whose work Birks acknowledged as the motivation for his switch to 
the absence of basis approach.  Aptly, she contributes “A Comparative View” 
of the approach.66  Taken together, the first two parts offer more than mere 
refinements or adjustments to an otherwise settled area of law.  Nor, from 
Birks’ perspective, is unjust enrichment law simply adapting to new demands 
imposed by external forces, such as new technologies, economic 
developments, globalization, and so forth.  For Birks, the confusion of unjust 
enrichment law has evolved for centuries, as a result of sloppily deployed 
legal fictions (e.g., quasi-contract, implied contract, and constructive trust) 
that upset the taxonomy.  The contributions are thus often taking sides in a 
dispute over how best the law should operate, according to which principles, 
and respecting which precedents. 
The third part, “Roman Law,” contains, not surprisingly, by far the 
most rigorously philological scholarship in the volume, emphasizing 
transmission of texts, laws, and legal norms.  Birks’ own work in Roman law 
informed his ideal of legal conceptual order and structure, as well as his 
ability to discern order in modern rules whose formative logic has been 
obscured by a fog of historical remoteness.  The final part, “Legal History,” 
similarly reveals the persistence of concerns shared by judges and jurists 
across centuries.  Thus, for example, one chapter describes the inception and 
evolution of a strict rule against fiduciaries who profit from their positions of 
trust, even absent loss to the beneficiary.  The volume closes with Prof. David 
Ibbetson’s response to “being-disagreed-with” by Birks regarding the analysis 
of duties of care in negligence liability by the eighteenth century lawyer, 
linguist, comparativist, and polymath William Jones.67  Ibbetson describes 
what he regards as Jones’ tendency to force his logical arguments into Natural 
Law containers, despite the resulting distortions. 
Throughout Mapping the Law, the contributors frame their 
substantive legal ideas with personal anecdotes about and panegyrics for 
Birks.  Biography is not their primary task, yet they present evidence of his 
personality, pedagogical and analytical skills, and contributions to scholarship 
and the legal system.  In their own contributions, they demonstrate that the 
loss of Birks is not total.  Dr. Joshua Getzler’s brief closing paragraph suitably 
reflects similar remarks by the others: 
 
Peter was passionate in his advocacy of a reasoned law, built 
on secure historical foundations and refined by scholarly 
debate, always seeking a better understanding and open to 
                                                 
66 Sonja Meier, No Basis: A Comparative Approach, in MAPPING THE LAW 343-
61. 
67 Ibbetson, supra note 12, at 619. 
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new arguments.  He gave and in turn inspired strong loyalty 
and affection as he shared with friends and colleagues his 
ideal. This is a precious legacy.68 
 
 Mapping the Law extends the legacy in its own way.  The 
collection presents some of the latest compelling thought in unjust enrichment 
law, yet it does so in fitting Birksian fashion, by recognizing the connections, 
paths, and borders that unjust enrichment law has to other areas of law, today 
and throughout history.  
   
Dean C. Rowan 
Reference Librarian 
Boalt Hall School of Law 
Berkeley, CA USA 
 
 
Rethinking Copyright: History, Theory, Language. By Ronan Deazley. 
Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 
2006. Pp. vii, 201. ISBN 1-84542-282-1. £55.00; US$95.00. 
 
 In Rethinking Copyright, Ronan Deazley, Professor on the Faculty of 
the University of Birmingham School of Law, UK, produces a well 
researched history of copyright and introduces some parallel critical themes, 
among them how historical antecedents have misconstrued copyright as a sort 
of natural right of the kind that is found in intellectual property laws of civil 
law jurisdictions. A central thesis of the book is that copyright does not exist 
under common law and is not and has not been supported by any previously 
advocated natural or property rights theory. The author traces the “conceit of 
common law copyright” that has been perpetrated through misuse of language 
by scholars and jurists alike to promote the interests of parties never intended 
to benefit by statutory authority, beginning with the Statute of Anne of 1709,[ 
8 Ann, c. 19] the first copyright act in England. 
      Popular notions of common law copyright have made their way from 
the strategy books of entrenched London booksellers in the 1600s who sought 
to extend their copyright protection against Scottish booksellers (Millar v. 
Taylor (1768) 4 Burr 2303 and Donaldson v. Beckett (1774) 4 Burr 2408) all 
the way to the language and rhetoric of modern cases involving the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 and the EU Information Society Directive. 
Deazley refutes the notion of common law copyright, whether it stems from 
                                                 
68 Joshua Getzler, Rumford Market and the Genesis of Fiduciary Obligations, in 
MAPPING THE LAW 577-98, 598. 
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John Locke’s Labor Theory of Property or other writers misconstruing 
copyright, as he asserts was the case with Copinger’s The Law of Copyright 
(1870) as well Joshua Montefiore’s The Law of Copyright (1802) and 
Espinasse’s Treatise on the Law of Actions on Statutes…and on the Statutes 
Respecting Copyright (1824). Deazley is also critical of reference to common 
law copyright in Robert Maughm’s A Treatise on the Law of Literary 
Property (1828). 
 Chapters one to three provide a history tinged journey through the 
backdrop of copyright and supporting philosophies. It is a bit slow going, but 
the journey then resumes on the correct path, according to Deazley, with 
Jeffreys v. Boosey (1854). Subsequent proliferation of published works and 
the phenomenon of the novel caused a clamoring for the expansion of 
copyright terms, and the legal scholarship of the era, according to Deazley, 
continued the misconception of a common law right in unpublished works. 
This issue arose in the case of the estate of Charles Dickens, Dickens v. 
Hawksley (1935), as to whether a legatee had the right to sell an unpublished 
manuscript of Dickens. 
 Chapter four discusses the theoretical approach to copyright and the 
issue of the public domain. The author traces the history of this contemporary 
topic and also surveys some useful current literature relating to open source 
movement matters. The chapter continues the discussion of the public domain 
and the impact of Digital Rights Management (DRM) technology, and their 
conflict with copyright law in extending copyright protection beyond 
copyright terms and interfering with the users ability to engage in lawful fair 
use reproduction of copyrighted works. This chapter is valuable for its 
articulate discussion of current and relevant international treaties and related 
domestic laws. 
 Chapter five begins the second part of the theory of copyright 
discussion, again using an array of impressive sources, such as Blackstone 
and Daniel DeFoe, and modern authorities such as Paul Goldstein, Raymond 
Nimmer and Jessica Litman, to support the author’s argument for a more 
“instrumentalist” or “consequentialist” approach to copyright.  versus the 
misguided natural rights or moral rights approach of authors such as Copinger 
and found in civil jurisdictions espousing droit d’auteur. 
 The author offers as a solution a change in the discourse of copyright. 
Rather than revert to ancient terminology of “monopoly” or “licenses” versus 
the misguided “property rights,” the author proposes using  “Intellectual 
Property Freedoms” and “Intellectual Property Privileges” as phrases more 
accurately reflecting the true history of copyright. The author expertly surveys 
the historical and contemporary scholarly, legislative, and juridical record to 
support his interpretation of the misplaced characterization of copyright as an 
inherent natural or human right. He does so in a time when there has been a 
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great expansion of the rights of copyright owners and when there has been a 
diminishment of the public domain and a call for changes in the copyright 
laws to strengthen the rights of individual copyright users in the wake of new 
technology that often overly restricts user freedoms. The book also speaks to 
the current firestorm over the expansion of the public domain and related 
Open Source Movement that challenges notions of traditional copyright. 
 The author has tried to combat the recharacterization of copyright as a 
fundamental right in a sweeping fashion, using an array of impressive 
authorities in a short space of about 200 pages. His success is unclear as the 
debate is ongoing; however, his argument is bold and at a minimum he  
demonstrates the great reach of copyright by beginning his discussion with 
John Locke’s’ Second Treatise on Government( 1690) and ending with a 
discussion of the 2005 case of Capitol Records v. Naxos. The book is of 
particular value as a reference tool with over 500 footnotes, a table of cases, a 
table of legislation, reference section, and an index. Overall, Rethinking 
Copyright is a small gem for an audience broader than copyright and 
intellectual property scholars, and well worth acquiring by a variety of 
general, corporate, law, and academic libraries. 
 
Laurence Seidenberg 
Reference Librarian 
Syracuse University College of Law 
Barclay Law Library 
Syracuse, NY USA 
 
 
E-Cycling: Linking Trade and Environmental Law in the EC and the U.S. 
By Harri Kalimo. Ardsley, New York: Transnational Publishers, 2006. Pp. ix, 
757. ISBN 1-57105-356-5. US$165.00 
 
 “Recycling is here to stay,” proclaims the author of this substantial 
tome that developed out of an earlier dissertation.  Of course, the 
collaborative principles of free trade are firmly entrenched as well.  This book 
explores the intersection and harmonization of the oft-competing interests of 
environmental protection and barrier-free economic growth through an in-
depth examination of the policies and processes concerning electronics 
recycling in the European Community and the United States.  The author's 
central point is that increased environmental protection does not have to be 
won at the expense of free trade, and vise versa. 
By focusing on the methods that deal with the end-of-life treatment of 
electronics and electrical components, the author presents a case study that 
differs from most works that cover trade and the environment.  Kalimo keeps 
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his analysis trained on this narrow topic in order to more fully flesh out the 
legal, economic, social, and even constitutional/federalism issues that arise 
when mature economies with established legal systems implement recycling 
requirements.  He looks for ways in which both environmental and economic 
interests have been reconciled and advanced, a desirable circumstance that he 
describes as pareto-preferable, or at its best, pareto-optimal.  He includes 
some analysis that contrasts the EC and U.S experiences, but unlike many 
comparative works that seek to explain the reasons for similarities and 
differences between jurisdictions, the purpose of Kalimo's comparisons is to 
present the reader with a larger set of controversies and solutions than could 
be found by limiting his analysis to one jurisdiction alone.   
The book begins with a thorough introduction that suffices to orient 
most readers, even those with only a passing knowledge of environmental or 
trade law concepts.  The second part of the book discusses the fields of trade 
and environmental law as well as the practical and regulatory processes of 
recycling electronics.  Harmonization and preemption schemes are given a 
fair amount of consideration from both the American and European legal 
perspectives.  The third part of the book goes into great detail about the 
various legislative and regulatory frameworks available for use in the EC and 
U.S. One such framework is that of  “extended producer responsibility,” 
under which the manufacturer is held responsible for its product after it 
becomes waste (an idea that has worked in some instances in Europe and 
Japan, but will strike some Americans as highly improbable, as the concept 
has received extensive opposition from industry in the U.S.).  The use and 
features of market-based incentives and programs, such as tradable pollution 
permits, are examined as well.  Finally, the fourth section of the book ties 
together the preceding chapters and offers pathways to the optimal solutions 
that provide for both growth and protection.  
In addition to covering hundreds of secondary sources, letters, 
interviews, and other documents, an expansive bibliography at the end of the 
book also includes a list of cases and a useful table of legislation, regulations, 
and reports from the EC and its individual member countries as well as from 
federal and state governments in the U.S.  An index, albeit short, adequately 
covers the topics addressed in the book. 
Don't be fooled by the book's narrow focus into believing that it is 
only for niche collections.  In the end, it is a well-researched examination of a 
problem that is situated at the intersection of two major areas of law, the 
elucidation of which entails not only the use of traditional legal analysis, but 
also the employment of analytical tools found in other disciplines such as 
economics, political science, and applied technology.  Furthermore, the 
concepts within can be applied to other regulatory systems that affect two or 
more sectors that have generally competing interests.  This book belongs in 
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most academic law libraries, especially those with strong environmental or 
law and economics collections. 
 
Jennifer Sekula 
The Wolf Law Library 
William & Mary School of Law 
Williamsburg, VA USA 
 
 
Statelessness, Human Rights and Gender: Irregular Migrant Workers from 
Burma in Thailand. By Tang Lay Lee. Leiden; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2005. Pp. xi, 285. ISBN 90-04-14648-2. €95.00; US$136.00. 
 
 The continued existence of stateless populations throughout the world 
over the past half century has proven to be a persistent and vexing problem 
for those concerned with refugee, migration, and humanitarian issues. While a 
large number of the relevant international law instruments addressing the 
question of statelessness were drafted in the aftermath of the great upheaval 
and displacement in Europe following the Second World War, the aspirations 
of the international community at that time to completely eradicate the 
scourge of statelessness has proven in retrospect to be a much more difficult 
task than first imagined.  Indeed, the re-emergence of statelessness as an 
significant humanitarian and human rights concern over the past decade has 
dramatically underscored the need to refocus attention on this basic human 
right. As a result of events such as the breakup of the former Soviet Union, 
the former Yugoslavia, and the former Czechoslovakia as well as the 
unintended consequences of globalization and worldwide economic 
instability, sizable stateless populations have once again emerged throughout 
the world.  While definitive statistics on the total number of stateless 
individuals are difficult to obtain, in 2006 the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) reported that those nations keeping reliable statistics 
estimated their stateless populations at 5.8 million, although the UNHCR 
believes worldwide populations to be closer to 15 million persons.69 
Given this robust resurgence of statelessness, fresh perspectives on 
the international law defining their legal status are essential for non-
governmental organizations, policy makers, and legislators tasked with 
drafting laws that will more effectively meet the exigencies of an increasingly 
interdependent world.  Porous borders and economic migrants have created a 
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ASYLUM-SEEKERS, RETURNEES, INTERNALLY DISPLACED AND STATELESS PERSONS 14 
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new paradigm of statelessness and these individuals are no longer adequately 
protected under current international standards. Thus, the publication of Tang 
Lay Lee’s Statelessness, Human Rights and Gender: Irregular Migrant 
Workers from Burma in Thailand is a much-needed comprehensive overview 
and critique of contemporary international law on the issue. Its exhaustive 
treatment of the topic also makes it an excellent primer for those unfamiliar 
with this area of law. Most importantly, the author looks beyond the black 
letter law to investigate the practical application of immigration and 
citizenship laws on vulnerable populations such as women and children. 
Statelessness, Human Rights and Gender begins with a detailed 
review of the international law of statelessness which is derived from United 
Nations resolutions, basic human rights provisions such as article 15(1) of the 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as other international and 
regional conventions dealing specifically with the issue. Other protections can 
be found in the 1951 Refugees Convention as they apply to refugees which 
may also include stateless persons. As is made clear by this chapter, this 
amalgam of international law instruments do not adequately safeguard the 
rights of all classes of stateless individuals and in total contain significant 
gaps in protection. For example, the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Stateless Persons provides the definition of a “stateless person” as someone 
“who is not considered as a national by any state under the operation of its 
law.”70 In practice, statelessness can take two forms: de jure or de facto. The 
first, de jure is defined in the 1954 Convention as  an individual who does not 
enjoy citizenship in any country.  Unfortunately, for many years, international 
law did not recognize and protect the second category of stateless person, the 
de facto or “effectively stateless person.” This is an individual who has fled or 
was expelled to another state and who could no longer count on the state of 
origin for protection even though the person retains his or her nationality. This 
is often the situation of illegal economic immigrants crossing borders to find 
work.  
As noted earlier, the fundamental law of statelessness was drafted in 
the post-Second World War period and it reflects the European experience of 
mass displacement. It also perpetuates the authority of the state to grant 
nationality vis-à-vis the individual, rather than focusing on protecting the 
fundamental human right of an individual to nationality.  Given that much of 
the modern migration is economic and the state retains the inherent power to 
control its borders and determine immigration status, this has created a new 
class of stateless individual that falls outside the protections of the present 
legal framework. Thus, migrant workers classified as “illegal” or “irregular” 
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may, by the force of that designation, be excluded from protection under these 
instruments and other human rights provisions. Indeed, Lee also examines the 
protections granted to other classes of individuals such as migrant workers 
and refugees under several International Labor Organization (ILO) and United 
Nations conventions.  From this analysis, a clear dichotomy emerges between 
the economic migrant and the political refugee. Mutually exclusive categories 
are created through exclusions in the applicable treaties and thus individuals 
often “fall through the cracks” between the three regimes of statelessness, 
refugee law, and migrant law.  
The fifth chapter of Statelessness, Human Rights and Gender 
provides a feminist critique of the law of statelessness, citizenship and 
migration. The United Nations estimates that women accounted for 49.6 per 
cent of global migrants in 2005, so their experiences are crucial in 
understanding the full scope and breadth of the issue.71x Through this 
analysis, Lee is able to place in sharp focus the gender inequities of 
statelessness inherent under international law and demonstrate how they 
intersect with domestic nationality laws that determine citizenship to 
disadvantage women and deprive them of their fundamental human rights.  In 
many parts of the world, citizenship is often based on the nationality of the 
father or husband. Thus, upon divorce or death of a spouse, foreign wives of 
nationals may face statelessness if they cannot retain their spouse’s nationality 
or reclaim their former citizenship, even while children retain their father’s 
nationality based on the jus sanguinis principle. The author illustrates the true 
cost of such patriarchal and discriminatory nationality laws through a case 
study of Burmese irregular workers in Thailand. The study effectively 
illustrates the role of nationality and migration law in producing statelessness 
among Burmese illegal immigrants working in Thailand. Burmese workers 
departing their homeland to work in Thailand find themselves in a legal no-
man’s land upon arrival in the host state and unable to secure adequate 
protection from either state. Nor do they enjoy any procedural rights to 
challenge their expulsion. Thus, Burmese women and children are trapped in 
a vicious cycle and forced to remain in the vulnerable position as “irregular” 
or “illegal” workers in order to earn a livelihood with no ability to establish 
legitimate citizenship status. Lee suggests that in view of the discriminatory 
nature of Burmese and Thai laws and the inherent shortcomings of 
international instruments, women should look to treaty-based human rights 
instruments such as the 1990 protocol to the 1979 Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).  She 
argues that the petition procedure in the protocol could possibly provide a 
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more fruitful avenue for redressing claims for discrimination and violations of 
the rights protected under the Convention. Of course, this presupposes that the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, the body 
administering the treaty. is granted more robust powers to enforce its 
decisions in the future .  
In addition to the book’s comprehensive treatment of these important 
legal issues, it also includes additional supplementary materials pertinent to 
the analysis.  Three appendices translate Thai citizenship and immigration 
laws referenced in the text. Unfortunately, relevant international conventions 
dealing with statelessness cited in the work were not included, although they 
would have been a welcome and useful addition. A selected bibliography 
offers a thorough overview of the essential literature on statelessness and 
migration issues and the volume includes a comprehensive subject index. 
Statelessness, Human Rights and Gender takes an insightful look at the 
intricate interplay between international law, human rights, nationality, and 
migration, especially with regard to its pernicious effect on vulnerable 
populations. Researchers interested in human rights issues of women and 
children will find much of interest in Tang Lay Lee’s account of Burmese 
irregular migrant workers in Thailand and the role that migration law plays in 
creating and perpetuating statelessness and gender discrimination. Her work is 
a valuable contribution to the literature and is a worthy addition to any 
collection of international human rights law, refugee law, and feminist legal 
studies. 
 
   
Herb Somers 
Foreign/International Law Librarian 
Jacob Burns Law Library 
The George Washington University Law School 
Washington, D.C. USA 
 
 
Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality, 3rd ed. By 
Fernando R. Tesón. Ardsley, New York: Transnational Publishers, 2005. Pp. 
vii-456. ISBN 1-57105-248-8. US$125.00. 
In the third edition of his book, Humanitarian Intervention: An 
Inquiry into Law and Morality, Professor Fernando R. Teson has expanded 
and revamped his argument that armed intervention in a foreign state may be 
justified on purely humanitarian grounds. Teson defines humanitarian 
intervention as proportionate help (including the use of force) by foreign 
governments to protect individuals in another state who are the victims of 
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severe tyranny or anarchy. He defines tyranny simply as a government’s 
denial of human rights. 
Teson argues, as a foundational principle, that debates about 
humanitarian intervention in international discourse should include 
considerations of moral philosophy in addition to the conventional positivist 
view of the international legal order. Traditionally, arguments about 
humanitarian intervention have been framed chiefly as a legal conflict 
between the ban on a state’s use of force against another state and the 
principle that individuals are entitled to fundamental human rights. In 
attempting to balance these imperatives, Teson argues that individual human 
rights should ultimately outweigh states’ interests as a matter of moral 
principle.  He rejects the utilitarian “statist” approach to international law as 
morally deficient. Based on his thesis that states have legitimacy only as 
agents of their citizens, Teson criticizes the accepted view that states, and not 
individuals, should be the primary subjects of international law. 
Teson’s overarching thesis is that allowing foreign intervention to 
suppress tyranny or anarchy is the best philosophical view, given the primacy 
of individual rights, and this view should direct how international legal 
materials relating to humanitarian intervention are interpreted. The first part 
of the book addresses his philosophical argument, and the second part 
addresses his legal argument for the right of humanitarian intervention. 
Teson first develops his argument negatively, not with his own 
proposed framework, but by attacking the arguments against any right of a 
state to intervene in the domestic affairs of another state. He criticizes what he 
sees as some of the wrong-headed assumptions of conventional non-
interventionist theory, e.g., that political morality is relative to particular 
societies and that foreigners should respect different cultures, even with 
tyrannical leaders.  However, he devotes the most time to disputing the idea 
that the state is an autonomous entity with moral rights or interests 
independent of those of its citizens (what Teson terms “the Hegelian myth”).  
Because traditional international law, and its emphasis on the sovereignty of 
states, rests on this premise, it is an important obstacle to Teson’s argument 
for a liberal right to intervene in other sovereign states for humanitarian 
reasons. He challenges this deferential view of state sovereignty as morally 
and ethically unacceptable, because it shields certain governments from 
intervention that do not deserve protection. Teson argues that a government 
that abuses its citizens ceases to represent them and should lose its claim to 
sovereignty in international law, at least for some purposes. 
Because Teson’s views on humanitarian intervention require a 
significant departure from traditional assumptions underlying international 
law, he tackles those assumptions first, and it is not until well into the book 
that he finally integrates the philosophical themes underlying his previous 
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responses to sketch a positive framework for humanitarian intervention. He 
argues that governments are mere agents of their citizens, both internationally 
and domestically, and their rights derive narrowly from a consensual transfer 
of rights from those citizens. In Teson’s view, states exist not primarily to 
ensure peace and order, but to secure the natural rights of individuals. 
Because one of the chief purposes of states is to protect the human rights of 
their citizens, a state becomes illegitimate when it turns against its people, 
forfeiting its own protection under international law against foreign 
intervention. Teson argues that all states are morally obliged to protect human 
rights at home and abroad, to promote respect for human rights globally, and 
to rescue victims of tyranny or anarchy if they can do so at reasonable cost to 
themselves. The necessary corollary to this moral obligation is the legal 
permission to rescue those victims, i.e., the right of humanitarian intervention. 
To guide legitimate humanitarian intervention, the author proposes 
several limitations on that right. First, the intervention must be aimed at 
ending only severe tyranny or anarchy—Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, Idi Amin’s 
Uganda, and Pol Pot’s Cambodia are easy examples. Given this limitation, 
Teson concludes that intervention is rarely ever permissible merely to restore 
democracy, especially in regions that have not enshrined democratic rule as a 
principle of government. Second, any humanitarian intervention must do more 
good than harm, must be proportionate to the evil it aims to suppress, and 
should never target innocent persons to achieve the humanitarian end. 
Additionally, the intervention must have a reasonable chance of success. In 
Teson’s view, humanitarian intervention may sometimes infringe the rights of 
innocent persons, but only to restore human rights in a country where they are 
being ignored in a widespread, obvious, and consistent manner. Finally, for 
intervention to be legitimate, the victims of tyranny or anarchy must welcome 
the assistance; states have a moral obligation to rescue individuals from the 
human rights abuses of their government only if they wish to be rescued.  
Teson rejects the idea that humanitarian intervention should require 
the approval of the United Nations Security Council. Given the deficiencies in 
the composition and international decision making procedures of the Security 
Council, he does not believe that Security Council approval should be 
necessary for international legitimacy. He notes that certain members of the 
Security Council, both permanent and nonpermanent, lack political credibility 
on human rights issues, thus giving the Council only the illusion of 
democratic legitimacy in votes on humanitarian intervention. The decision to 
help victims of human rights abuses should not depend on the approval of 
states with poor human rights records themselves. Additionally, he argues that 
the veto power for Security Council votes is morally arbitrary and gives 
disproportionate power to some states, effectively preventing humanitarian 
intervention against any permanent member of the Council or its allies. 
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Professor Teson does believe, in principle, that a humanitarian 
intervention should have the approval of the community of democratic states, 
i.e., states that are morally entitled to speak for their citizens. However, given 
the inaction or lack of political will that may occur in democratic states even 
in severe humanitarian crises, e.g., during the atrocities in Rwanda and 
Kosovo, he believes that sometimes unilateral intervention is morally 
justified. 
In the second part of the book, Professor Teson argues that 
humanitarian intervention is not incompatible with existing international legal 
norms, particularly article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, which prohibits 
the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
any state, or in a manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. 
He then surveys state practice relating to humanitarian intervention, including 
examples of both unilateral intervention and intervention authorized by the 
Security Council.  
Teson reads article 2(4) narrowly, not to flatly prohibit the use of 
force against another state, but to ban it only in the circumstances specified, 
i.e., when it impairs territorial integrity, when it affects political 
independence, or when it is otherwise against the purposes of the United 
Nations. The first two conditions are not implicated in a genuine humanitarian 
intervention, because intervention does not end in the capture of territory or 
political subjugation. Although the literal language of the third condition, 
referring to any other use of force against the purposes of the United Nations, 
could in fact be interpreted to support armed intervention to protect human 
rights, Teson notes that in practice, the U.N. system has placed priority on 
peace and the stability of governments rather than on human rights. He then 
argues, under basic principles of natural law and regarding the sanctity of 
human life, that protecting human rights is as important as controlling 
international conflict. Finally, he concludes that neither the U.N. Charter’s 
text, nor its intent, prevents an interpretation of its norms in favor of 
humanitarian intervention. 
Although the thesis of his book is primarily a philosophical one, the 
author uses numerous case studies to support his arguments for a right of 
humanitarian intervention, and to show at least a limited custom or practice of 
intervention among democratic states. In characterizing an intervention as 
humanitarian, he argues that what governments say is not as definitive as what 
they do, and thus, for example, rhetoric justifying an intervention as self-
defense should not affect the essential humanitarian result. The case studies 
provide a chilling review of some of the atrocities committed by governments 
during the late twentieth century, and support the author’s view of an 
emerging custom of state humanitarian practice, at least within the limits he 
has defined. He includes Tanzania’s intervention in Uganda and French 
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intervention in Central Africa in 1979, India’s intervention in Bangladesh in 
1971, and the United States’ interventions in Grenada and Panama. His 
examples of interventions authorized by the U.N. Security Council include 
those relating to Iraq’s treatment of the Kurds in 1991; Somalia in 1992-93; 
Haiti, Rwanda, and Bosnia in 1994; and Sierra Leone in 1997.  
Finally, in a thoughtful chapter on NATO’s intervention in Kosovo 
and the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq, Teson asserts that events since 1999 
have both affirmed and tested the moral and legal assumptions of his theories. 
He interprets the intervention in Kosovo as the “purest” example of the 
balancing of sovereignty against human rights in favor of humanitarian 
considerations, in that the intervention against Yugoslavia reflected the moral 
consensus of nations to act against “ethnic cleansing” and severe tyranny. 
Consistent with his earlier critique of the U.N. Security Council, the author 
was untroubled by NATO’s inability to obtain approval from that body for the 
intervention. 
Regarding Iraq, Professor Teson is careful to limit his analysis to 
whether the war could be justified as a legitimate humanitarian intervention; 
he does not address the most heated issues of political debate, e.g., whether 
the arguments given for the intervention were genuine, whether preemptive 
self-defense is ever permissible under international law, or whether the war on 
Iraq could be justified as a reaction to the attacks of September 11, 2001. 
Consistent with his thesis that moral philosophy should inform international 
law in this area, he argues that the war was indeed justified as a humanitarian 
intervention. Even if the coalition forces did not have a humanitarian intent in 
going to war, they intended to topple Saddam Hussein and committed 
themselves afterwards to helping Iraqis reconstruct their society politically 
and economically. In Teson’s view, ulterior motives do not negate the 
humanitarian nature of the intervention, and we should not require that an 
intervention be motivated only by humanitarian concerns. More 
controversially, Teson argues that in addition to ending severe tyranny in Iraq, 
the intervention also meets his other tests for legitimacy in that it did more 
good than harm, did not involve unacceptable civilian losses, and was 
welcomed by the great majority of ordinary Iraqi citizens. He concludes that 
in the end, the U.S.-led intervention reflected a courageous effort to rid the 
world of a ruthless tyrant and should be supported by anyone committed to 
liberal democratic values in the broad sense. 
World events at the turn of the new century have brought debates 
about humanitarian intervention to the forefront of social, political, and legal 
attention. Professor Tesson’s book in its third edition is a thought-provoking 
vehicle for questioning traditional views of international law and the modern 
balance it should strike between human rights and respect for state 
sovereignty. Notwithstanding the difficulty of defining or implementing 
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specific standards for legitimate humanitarian intervention, it is hard to argue 
against the need for greater emphasis on the protection and sanctity of human 
life under international law in the twenty-first century. 
 
Ursula Weigold 
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